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INTRODUCTION
Economic analysis has not played a significant role in the in-
creasingly intense debate over the decline of professionalism among
lawyers.' Economists' lack of interest in the issue may be under-
1. This is beginning to change. Robert Mnookin's and my work is one example. See
Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corpo-
rate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985) [hereinafter Gil-
son & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capitalists]; Gilson & Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate
Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1989). Some
sociologically oriented students of the legal profession also have picked up the bug. See
R. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW
FIRM (1988); Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational
Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989); Galanter & Palay, The Big Law Firm: Its Growth
and Transformation (1989) (unpublished manuscript) (to be fair, Palay is trained as an
economist; Galanter's guilt is by association). Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68
B.U.L. REV. 1, 52 (1988), also makes effective use of economic analysis, although he
complains some. ("Yet [economic analysis] is also a notoriously limited and impover-
ished discourse, historically, sociologically, and philosophically illiterate, without a vo-
cabulary for any norm but efficiency, and-though there is nothing in the least necessary
about this feature-habitually given an apologetic ideological spin in practice.")
I suspect the lessening hostility toward economic analysis among non-adherents
rests on the growing visibility of transaction cost economics whose paradigm-a market
that is characterized by limited rationality and substantial friction and which therefore
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standable. The lawyers' lament is that the legal profession is devolv-
ing into the business of law. That this concern has not captured the
economists' attention may reflect only that economists do not view
the label "business" as a pejorative. If becoming a business means
efficiently rendering an important service in a competitive environ-
ment, then of what is there to complain?
Lawyers, more directly concerned with maintaining their pro-
fessional status, would find little comfort in this explanation for the
economists' inattention. From the lawyers' perspective, economists
lack appreciation for what is lost in the gap between a business and a
profession: the grand Brandesian vision of a public role for lawyers
that contemplates a broader professional obligation than to act only
in the client's (or the lawyer's) self-interest.
Both views-economists' indifference to the lawyers' public ori-
ented vision of professionalism and the disdain students of the legal
profession often display for economic analysis-are incomplete in
important respects. By applying economic analysis to highlight the
critical role of professionalism in the market for legal services, it is
possible to demonstrate the importance of both professionalism as a
concept and economics as a means to analyze it. To be sure, noth-
ing special is gained from translating standard sociological analyses
of the functions of professionalism into "economese" unless the
translation results in new insights.2 But such insights are in fact
available here. An economic perspective suggests an important
function of professionalism that has gone largely unobserved under
traditional modes of analysis. Additionally, an economic perspec-
tive on professionalism helps identify the sources of the quite real
pressures on the legal profession's continued ability to perform this
function and the quite real limits on the profession's ability to do
very much about it.
My thesis is that important elements of what have been tradi-
tionally understood as professional standards operate not as free-
requires careful attention to institutional detail-is much more compatible to those used
to working in other social sciences than the perfect market paradigm of traditional law
and economic analysis. For a thoughtful description of the potential for further compli-
cating the vision of the world on which law and economics operates, see Ellickson, Bring-
ing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65
Cm.-KENr L. REV. 23 (1989).
2. Dr. Suess captures nicely the futility of interdisciplinary translation for the sake
of translation alone. In a book designed to console a despondent child by showing how
much worse things could really be, Suess tells us: "And how fortunate you're not Profes-
sor de Breeze who has spent the past thirty-two years, if you please, trying to teach Irish
ducks to readJivvanese." DR. SUESS (T. GEISEL), DID I EVER TELL You How LUCKY You
ARE? 30 (1973) (emphasis in original).
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standing statements describing appropriate behavior by lawyers, or
even as paternalistic proclamations concerning lawyers' treatment
of clients. Rather, important elements of professional standards
serve to cast lawyers in the role of enforcers of agreements among
clients. And if this is right, then the continued viability of these ele-
ments of professionalism depends not only on the attitude of law-
yers, but, more importantly, on the attitude of clients: Will clients
still allow lawyers to play the role of enforcer? From this perspec-
tive, the threat to professionalism comes from the demand side, not
the supply side. The good news for lawyers is that economic analy-
sis of legal professionalism provides some solace-the devolution of
the profession may not be our fault. The bad news is that, for pre-
cisely the same reason, there may be very real limits on what the
profession alone can do to arrest the decline.
Part I of this Article sets the context for my argument: the
traditional prohibition of strategic litigation. Part II examines the
traditional approach to enforcing the prohibition: ex post direct en-
forcement. We find that whether strategic litigation is defined ob-
jectively or subjectively, the inevitable outcome is an underinclusive
definition and a resulting ineffective prohibition. Part III then turns
to a different enforcement approach: ex ante indirect enforcement
through the lawyer as gatekeeper. The principal focus is on the con-
ditions necessary to the operation of a gatekeeper enforcement re-
gime-whether lawyers can detect strategic litigation ex ante;
whether lawyers will be willing to supply gatekeeping services (the
supply side of the market for legal services); and whether clients Vill
allow lawyers to be gatekeepers (the demand side of the market for
legal services).
Having shown that conditions in the market for legal services
once allowed a regime of gatekeeper enforcement of the prohibition
of strategic litigation, Part IV confronts the devolution of the legal
profession: What changes in the market for legal services have di-
minished lawyers' ability to act as gatekeepers? Part V then consid-
ers alternative approaches to shoring up a faltering gatekeeper
regime: increasing the penalty on the gatekeeper as through the
1983 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11; increasing
the penalty on the wrongdoer (the client) as through requiring in-
creased disclosure to restrict accountant opinion shopping; and,
more speculatively, changing the identity of the gatekeeper from
outside to inside counsel. Finally, Part VI concludes by briefly con-
sidering the argument's impact on the potential for success of cur-
[VOL. 49:869
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rent approaches to rekindling the spirit of professionalism.'
I. SETTING THE CONTEXT: THE PROHIBITION OF STRATEGIC
LITIGATION
As a vehicle for applying economic analysis to professionalism,
I will focus on the traditional professional prohibition of strategic
litigation. This standard is currently expressed in Rule 3.1 of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
3. A subtext of my argument is an effort to respond to an important comment on
the devolution literature made by Robert Nelson and David Trubeck:
If we use as indicators of concern the amount of time devoted to the issue, the
prestige of the people involved, the attention paid to it by leaders of the bar
throughout the country, one would have to conclude that the organized bar is
very concerned with the possibility that professionalism is in decline and is
committed to doing something about this situation. However, if one analyzes
the reports, editorials, and commentary on professionalism in some detail, the
situation seems less unambiguous. In the first place, it is really hard to derive
any clear and concrete notion of "professionalism" from much of the literature
.... Secondly, while the rhetoric suggests a decline in professionalism, no
clear or convincing account is given of why that might be occurring today and
what forces might lie behind alleged lapses from professional norms. Third,
although a number of "remedies" are offered to curb the decline in profession-
alism, these are so diffuse in nature as to undermine the idea that they deal with
any coherent issue, and are often cosmetic in character or moralistic and
exhortative.
R. Nelson & D. Trubeck, Lawyer Professionalism and its Discontents": From Arenas of
Words to Arenas of Work 16-17 (1988) (Paper presented at the American Bar Founda-
tion Conference on Professionalism, Ethics, and Economic Change in the Legal Profes-
sion).
I mean my story to have the beginning, middle and end, whose absence Nelson and
Trubeck lament: a clear statement of the concept of professionalism I have in mind; an
explanation of what went wrong; and a logically related, albeit not overly optimistic,
recommendation about what we can do about it. I should also respond to an expected,
but nonetheless valid criticism of this effort. My account of lawyers as gatekeepers is at
best a stylized history; I offer no reliable data, historical or otherwise, that this enforce-
ment regime ever flourished. In this respect, the story told here shares with the devolu-
tion literature a common thread that also was criticized by Nelson and Trubeck: "[N]o
evidence has been marshalled to show there is more 'unprofessional' conduct today than
in the past.. Id. at 19-20; accord Rotunda, Lawyers and Profe.sionalism: A Commentary on
the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, 18 Loy. U. Cm. L.J.
1149, 1151 (1987) ("The charge of decline is serious, and deserves to be supported by
more than anecdotal analysis.") Nonetheless, a value exists in providing an internally
complete and consistent account of one aspect of professionalism. By specifying the
model clearly enough, it at least allows the empirical questions to be framed in a coher-
ent and investigable way. Cf. E. Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology 4 (Pa-
per presented at the annual meetings of the American Association of Law Schools,
Miami Beach, Jan. 10, 1988) ("[A]n analytical model does not purport to represent em-
pirical reality, but it does claim to create a systematic way of thinking about that reality
by picking out what is most consequential or important about it and by showing how an
institution can work. It does not describe reality so much as create a conceptual yardstick
against which the empirical world can be measured." (emphasis in the original)).
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"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert a posi-
tion or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law."' 4 The same con-
cept was reflected, somewhat more explicitly, in the Model Rule's
predecessor. Disciplinary Rule 7-102 (A) (1) of the American Bar As-
sociation's Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a law-
yer may not "file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a
trial or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or
when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or
maliciously injure another."5
As commonly understood, these rules present a good example
of the internal tension between the two roles for lawyers that, in
uneasy conjunction, comprise the traditional concept of profession-
alism. On the one hand, professionalism is synonymous with client
advocacy. It is the lawyer's complete commitment to achieving what
the client wants that defines a true professional.6 On the other
hand, the lawyer's client advocacy role is limited by her public inter-
est role. For example, in Model Rule 3.1 the very essence of the
lawyer's obligation when a client wishes to assert a frivolous claim or
defense is not to do what the client wants.7 Efforts to ameliorate the
inherent tension between the lawyer's client advocacy and public in-
terest roles-between the obligation of zealous representation and
the prohibition of strategic litigation-constitute an important part
of the traditional legal profession literature.
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983). The January 1980
draft of this element of the Model Rules was more forceful: "'[A] lawyer shall bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, only when a lawyer acting
in good faith would conclude that there is a reasonable basis for doing so.'" See S.
GILLERS & N. DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHics 523 (2d
ed. 1989) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(b)).
5. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1969). Earlier
versions of the same prohibition appear in § 14 of the 1887 ALABAMA LAWYERS CODE OF
ETHics ("An attorney must decline in a civil cause to conduct a prosecution, when satis-
fied that the purpose is merely to harass or injure the opposite party, or to work oppres-
sion and wrong") and in Canon 30 of the 1908 American Bar Association's CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHics ("The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil case or make a de-
fense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party
or to work oppression or wrong").
6. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) ("The
duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law .... ") For a different approach to reaching the
same outcome, see Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundation of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 1060 (1976).
7. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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From my perspective, the standard of conduct reflected in
Model Rule 3.1 suggests a quite-different function for this element
of professionalism, one that eliminates the apparent conflict be-
tween the profession's two traditional faces. From this perspective,
the limits stated in Model Rule 3.1 serve to facilitate, not frustrate,
the client's best interests. Rather than stating the circumstances in
which a lawyer's public interest role requires the lawyer to prevent
the client from achieving his immediate desire, the limits are actu-
ally those specified by the client to achieve his real goal.
The manner in which the denial of a client's immediate desire
facilitates achieving his real goal can be seen by shifting backward
the point in time when the client's interests are evaluated. Rather
than focusing on what the client wants at the time he seeks to file the
strategic litigation, consider instead what he would want at the time
the rules governing such litigation are chosen.
Imagine that all the potential clients in the world are assembled
behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance8 to select the rules that would
govern the initiation and conduct of litigation. In the Rawlsian con-
struct, potential clients would not know-actually or probabilisti-
cally-whether they would turn out to be plaintiffs or defendants,
nor whether they would have substantial resources with which to
conduct any litigation. The purpose of this construct is to harness
self-interest in the service of selecting socially optimal rules. Be-
cause of the veil of ignorance, a potential client can select a rule that
benefits himself only by selecting a rule that maximizes the position
of all clients as a group.9
Now suppose the assembly is posed the following question:
Should a party be allowed to use litigation not to vindicate a sub-
stantive legal right, but as a strategic device to secure a business
advantage by imposing costs on the other party? l ° Unfortunately,
examples of such strategic uses of litigation are commonplace. A
leading takeover lawyer advises that a target company's first re-
sponse to a hostile takeover bid should be to sue the bidder." The
point is not that the bidder has necessarily violated any legal rule,
but that filing suit, whatever the grounds, will build the morale of
8. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 12, 136-42 (1971).
9. See id. at 140.
10. This definition of strategic litigation is consistent with the more formal develop-
ment of the concept in Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1067, 1083-84 (1989) (action strategic when it affects
only the other parties' costs and not the strategic action's likelihood of success or size of
recovery).
11. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437-38 (1977).
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the target company's employees, can signal the target's intention to
vigorously resist, and may chill the arbitrage thought central to the
bidder's success.' 2 Only then does the author consider the possible
legal bases for suit.' 3 Similarly, a trade secret suit is frequently filed
when employees of a high technology company leave to start a new
company, often before the complaining former employer even
knows what product the employees' company will produce. The
lawsuit may turn out to be groundless, but it may nonetheless suc-
ceed in creating enough uncertainty to chill the new business's ac-
cess to venture capital, and thereby doom or seriously cripple the
potential competitor. 1
4
It should be apparent that our Rawlsian assembly of clients
would prohibit strategic use of litigation. Although such litigation
can serve to redistribute wealth between the parties, behind the veil
a client could not predict whether he would be the perpetrator of
such litigation or its object. And because such litigation imposes a
pure dead weight loss, prohibition would be in everyone's
interest. 15
The problem with such a prohibition is enforcement. Once the
veil of ignorance is lifted, it often will be in the interest of a particu-
lar litigant to ignore the prohibition. The systemic costs of reintro-
ducing strategic litigation are largely externalized-shared by all
potential clients-while the particular litigant captures all the bene-
fits of the wealth transfer resulting from its use in the particular
case. The prohibition will therefore tend to break down absent an
effective means of enforcement. The next two parts of this Article
consider two different regimes for enforcing the Rawlsian assem-
bly's prohibition of strategic litigation. The first--ex post direct en-
forcement by the injured party-is the traditional approach to
enforcing obligations to third parties. The second, in which lawyers
play the role of "gatekeepers", serves to reduce dramatically the
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1438-39.
14. See A. Silverman, Symposium Report: Intellectual Property Law and the Venture
Capital Process (May 1989) (Summary of Symposium Sponsored by the Stanford Inter-
national Center for Law and Technology and the John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics reporting results of survey of 30 San Francisco law firms active in intellectual
property disputes against start-up companies); cf. Gupta, Start-Ups Face Big-Time Legal
Artillery, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1988, at B2, col. 2.
15. Conceivably the imposition of costs could have allocative impact as well, either
positive or negative. Increased costs could reduce innovations or, less clearly, could
protect investment in innovation if the original property right was not firmly fixed. See
infra note 19.
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costs of an ex post direct enforcement regime. 6 The availability of
such a gatekeeper approach-using lawyers as an ex ante screen to
prevent, rather than punish, strategic litigation-seems to me to ex-
plain both the professional prohibition on strategic litigation and
the limited role of direct enforcement in this area.
II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH: Ex POST DIRECT ENFORCEMENT
The traditional legal approach to enforcing obligations is ex post
-direct enforcement. The party injured by the breach of an obliga-
tion can sue the party that committed the breach for the damages
suffered. In the context of strategic litigation, an ex post direct en-
forcement approach gives the object of such litigation a cause of
action against the perpetrator-we might call it a cause of action for
malicious prosecution. 7
The central problem in designing a system of ex post direct en-
forcement is the accuracy with which you can determine after the
fact that the prohibition against strategic litigation has in actuality
been breached. The difficulty is defining strategic litigation in a
fashion that minimizes the costs associated with the definition being
either under or overinclusive.' The definition is underinclusive
when some litigation that is in fact strategic escapes the prohibition.
The costs of underinclusion are straightforward: because some stra-
tegic litigants will get away with it, a larger number will try. 9
The costs of overinclusion are less obvious. A definition of
16. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
17. See infra notes 22-23 (discussion of the elements of the tort of malicious
prosecution).
18. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257 (1974) (general development of the concept of over and underinclusive legal rules).
19. The specific costs imposed depend on the purpose for which strategic litigation
is used in a particular setting. For example, if strategic litigation is used to create market
entry barriers (for example, through ultimately meritless claims that a new product is no
more than an unauthorized copy of a competitor's existing product) then the costs are
the loss of competition for the benefit of consumers.
More specifically, when the probability of getting caught is less than one, and dam-
ages if one is caught are limited to the injury caused, it will be to the advantage of a risk
neutral litigant to pursue the strategic litigation so long as the strategic gains exceed the
expected value of the damages. A careful definition tries to ameliorate the problem by
increasing the probability that a strategic litigant is caught. A different approach to un-
derinclusion is to alter instead the amount of the damages. If the damages awarded
exceed the actual damages suffered, then the cost of getting caught goes up even if the
likelihood of getting caught does not. Thus, the potential for punitive damages would
also be a response to an underinclusive definition. See Cooter, Punitive Damagesfor Deter-
rence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989).
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strategic litigation is overinclusive when some litigation that in fact
is not strategic will be erroneously found to fall within it. An overin-
clusive definition has the costly effect of diluting substantive prop-
erty rights. 'Litigation is one way in which a person protects his
property 'rights. When access to that form of protection is con-
strained--here by the risk that nonstrategic litigation mistakenly will
be swept up in the definition-the value of the property right itself is
reduced.. This point can be illustrated by a situation referred to ear-
lier as an e*,ample of strategic litigation: a trade secret suit by a high
technology ernployer against former employees who form a compet-
ing company:. In. the earlier example, the employer brought suit
only to prevent lawful competition.
Now cohsider the former employer's situation from a different
perspective.. Suppose a high technology company hires an engineer
with the understanding that it will pay the engineer a fixed salary
regardless of whether the engineer makes a discovery, but if a dis-
covery 6 curs, the company will get the benefit.2" Without an effec-
tive means. to'enforce that understanding, the arrangement is not
stable. If the engineer actually makes a discovery, she has an obvi-
ous ince4tive to leave the company and exploit the discovery her-
self, with the -result that the original understanding deteriorates into
an option" in favor of the engineer. Litigation is thus an important
means by which the company can protect against the engineer's mis-
appropriatiOil of its property right in the discovery. Increased cost
for such protection, because of the risk that such litigation will be
erroneotisly. found to be strategic, diminishes the value of the prop-
erty 'right. the company acquires and, therefore, diminishes the in-
centive to invest in innovating-to hire the engineer-in the first
place,-
The task is 'thus to define strategic litigation in a fashion that
minimizes the cost of under and overinclusiveness. Two approaches
come to iind. The first, an objective approach, attempts precision
of application by looking to the extent of legal support for the alleg-
edly strategic, litigation as a proxy for inquiring into the plaintiff's
subjective intent. The second approach takes precisely the opposite
tack, eschewifig analysis of the objective characteristics of the plain-
tiff's behavior7-whether there was sufficient legal support for the
claim asserted-in favor of directly examining the plaintiff's subjec-
20. The logiq of the arrangement reflects the company's ability to pool the risk that
particukig engineers will never make a discovery. Assuming that individual engineers
are risk averse and that, because of pooling, the company is risk neutral, there is gain
from shifting the7 risk of nondiscovery from an individual engineer to the company.
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tive intent: Did the plaintiff intend the litigation as strategic? Un-
fortunately, both approaches share a common failing: the resulting
definition in both approaches will be inevitably underinclusive, with
the further result that ex post enforcement of the prohibition of stra-
tegic litigation will be inevitably ineffective.
A. An Objective Approach: The Inevitability of Underinclusion
An objective approach to defining strategic litigation looks to
the extent of legal support for the challenged action as a readily
observable signal of whether the plaintiff had the unobservable
nasty intent: to inflict costs on the defendant without regard to the
legal basis for the claim. The idea is that so long as there is an ap-
propriate level of legal support for the claim, a legitimate basis for it
is said to exist even if the cost of defense also gives the plaintiff a
nonlegal strategic benefit. The hoped for advantage of an objective
approach is precision of coverage; specifying the amount of legal
support required is less likely to be applied incorrectly than specify-
ing the prohibited intent and then determining whether it was
present.
The question posed by an objective approach is how much is
enough? How little legal support will brand an action as strategic?
Virtually any specification of the support necessary to avoid thela-
bel strategic is inevitably somewhat overinclusive. The resulting
problem is that the magnitude of the costs of overinclusiveness will
push an objective definition toward underinclusion.
Suppose the plaintiff's lawyer believes that some support for
her client's position exists, but that, on balance, the plaintiff will
lose. An objective approach would require the plaintiff to show that,
ex ante, he had the requisite probability of success. But regardless of
how low the probability is set, so long as there is any legal support
for the plaintiff's position, a possibility remains that the action is not
strategic. If deterring genuinely nonstrategic actions that nonethe-
less lack the specified level of legal support is costly, then the
probability chosen is undesirably overinclusive.
If the goal is to avoid the costs of an overinclusive definition of
strategic litigation, a simple answer to how little legal support
brands an action as strategic might be none: an action is strategic
only if no legal support for it exists. But even a "no support" stan-
dard may be overinclusive. Suppose the only existing precedent is
contrary to the plaintiff's position. If the plaintiff loses the case, can
he defend against the defendant's subsequent action for pursuing
strategic litigation on the ground that he tried to persuade the court
1990] 879
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to overturn existing precedent? If he cannot, then the standard re-
mains seriously overinclusive because it could deter a party from
arguing for a change in existing law, the very engine that is claimed
to drive the common law's progress toward efficiency.2 '
The upshot is that because an overinclusive definition of strate-
gic litigation can impose substantial costs, and because an objective
approach to defining strategic litigation is inevitably overinclusive,
such an approach would tend toward an underinclusive "straight
face" standard. That is, if the plaintiff's lawyer can stand before the
court and recite the argument without smiling, the litigation is not
strategic. 22 If such a standard prevails, it is apparent that fear of a
direct action for strategic litigation will have little deterrent effect on
a plaintiff contemplating strategic litigation. To be sure, some out-
rageous conduct may still be caught, but that is not the object of the
exercise. The Rawlsian assembly had in mind prohibiting a broader
range of activity.
B. A Subjective Approach: Underinclusion Again
The externalities that drive an objectively based definition to-
ward underinclusion-dilution of property rights and restriction of
the process of common-law development-result from using a mea-
sure of existing legal support as a signal of strategic intent. An al-
ternative approach frames the definition directly in terms of the
underlying subjective characteristic: Did the plaintiff intend the liti-
gation as strategic?
Although an intent standard does not trigger the external costs
that flow from an objective approach, the difficulties peculiar to a
subjective approach also push, in the end, toward underinclusion.
21. See, e.g., Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Effcient Rules, 6J. LEGAL
STUD. 65, 81 (1977); Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL SrUD. 51, 61
(1977).
22. The commentary to Model Rule 3.1 suggests this result for lawyers:
The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not
frivolous . . . even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ulti-
mately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however .... if the lawyer is
unable to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to
support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion or reversal of existing law.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 comment (1983).
The same result appears with respect to the elements of a cause of action for mali-
cious prosecution. In this setting, the objective approach is reflected in the requirement
that the plaintiff prove that there was no "probable cause" for filing the original lawsuit.
The probable cause requirement apparently is satisfied quite easily. See Wade, On Frivo-
lous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HoFsTRA L. REV. 433,
444-45 (1986).
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These difficulties, however, result from a very different problem of
definition. The problem with a subjective approach is error. Be-
cause of the difficulty of fact finding, a subjective approach can be
simultaneously over and underinclusive, with costs resulting from
error in either direction. But because a strategic plaintiff will have
had the opportunity to shape the facts in a favorable manner, the
dominant result is, again, underinclusiveness.
The overinclusive aspects of a subjective definition of strategic
litigation result simply from the potential for the trier of fact to
make a mistake. The jury will decide, based on the testimony
presented, whether the plaintiff had the prohibited intent. But the
process of determining subjective intent is especially prone to error.
Leaving aside for the moment the incentives of both parties to ac-
tively shape the fact finding process in their favor, an after-the-fact
determination of what one party had in mind when it took an earlier
action is made difficult by the familiar process by which one's beliefs
about one's past acts are influenced by one's present circumstances.
Even if that error is randomly distributed between over and under-
inclusion, so long as the plaintiff whose litigation is challenged as
strategic is risk averse, the potential for any overinclusion-the po-
tential that the litigation will mistakenly be determined strategic and
damages awarded-will deter some beneficial conduct. To avoid
that result, the definition will tend toward underinclusion.2 s
The more serious problem, however, is that, in the context of a
definition of strategic litigation, the fact finding process itself is in-
herently biased toward underinclusion. A plaintiff who is consider-
ing filing a suit for strategic purposes has the opportunity to plan-
to structure his action to create a record that supports a non-
strategic explanation. Whatever criteria are developed by courts as
indicia of the prohibited intent can be incorporated into the plain-
tiff's planning process and more or less avoided.24 To be sure,
some behavior will be so blatant that it cannot be camouflaged even
with the benefit of planning and some plaintiffs (and their lawyers)
will be so unsophisticated that they neglect to fashion a favorable
23. The subjective component of the elements of a cause of action for malicious
prosecution-that the plaintiff prove that the original action was filed with malice-re-
flects this influence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 (1981); Wade, supra
note 22, at 448-50.
24. The ability to shape one's conduct in light of the criteria used to evaluate subjec-
tive intent is not symmetric among the parties. Because the criteria would focus on the
behavior of the party initiating the allegedly strategic litigation, the initiating party can
plan its conduct with the criteria in mind. The object of the strategic litigation, in con-
trast, has no opportunity to alter its behavior until the suit is filed.
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record. As with the narrow swath of an objective definition, how-
ever, the Rawlsian assembly had in mind prohibiting a broader
range of activity.
C. Summary
Analysis of either an objective or subjective definition of strate-
gic litigation leads to the conclusion that a regime of ex post direct
enforcement is unlikely to achieve the goal of significantly deterring
the opportunistic pursuit of strategic litigation.25 Even though cli-
ents would agree unanimously to prohibit strategic litigation when
they were shielded from self-interest by the veil of ignorance, once
the veil is lifted individual clients would be free to seek the wealth
transfer attainable by behaving strategically with respect to particu-
lar litigation. The puzzle is that, at least over much of our history,
clients, especially commercial clients, do not seem to have behaved
this way. The task, then, is to identify what institution may have
served to enforce the Rawlsian assembly's prohibition of strategic
litigation when the tradition l regime of ex post direct enforcement
was not up to the challenge. 6
III. A GATEKEEPER APPROACH: Ex ANTE INDIRECT ENFORCEMENT
Ex post direct enforcement fails because it cannot define strate-
gic litigation with precision. An objective approach identifies strate-
gic litigation through the presence of an observable signal, but the
noisiness of the signal causes significant externalities that are
avoided by an underinclusive definition. A subjective approach
looks directly to whether the original plaintiff had a strategic intent,
but this approach is also imprecise. By the time enforcement takes
place, a carefully constructed record and the more general difficulty
of reconstructing the original plaintiff's intent at the time the alleg-
25. This is certainly the conventional wisdom with respect to the tort of malicious
prosecution. The following evaluation is typical: "The courts have placed stringent re-
strictions upon this tort action. In some states, the restrictions are so stringent as to
render the cause of action essentially unavailable." Wade, supra note 22, at 438.
26. M. Galanter &J. Rogers, The Transformation of American Disputing: Some Pre-
liminary Observations (June 1988) (unpublished manuscript), provide suggestive data
concerning the timing of the phenomenon. From 1960 to 1986, filings of contract cases
in federal court increased some 250% and commercial arbitration filings rose from ap-
proximately 800 to approximately 7,600 over the same period. Id. at 15-18. Galanter
and Rogers examine a number of possible explanations for their empirical observation
that "'[slomething happened' in American business in the 1970s, and something hap-
pened in business disputing around the same period." Id. at 25. My goal here is to
focus on the role of the legal profession in this phenomenon.
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edly strategic suit was filed, combine to make strategic litigation dif-
ficult to identify. 'With both approaches, the ultimate outcome is an
underinclusive definition and too little enforcement.
An alternative approach to enforcing the prohibition of strate-
gic litigation is what Reinier Kraakman has called a "'gatekeeper"
regime.27 In Kraakman's analysis, a gatekeeper is a':private party
who can prevent another party's misconduct by withholding. his, co-
operation from the would-be wrongdoer. In other words, the mis-
conduct cannot occur without the gatekeeper's park.i'ation.
Securities lawyers provide a straightforward example. lAeg ,opin-
ion is typically necessary to complete a placeniert of secutieS
under the private offering exemption from registra dtii -rder" the
Securities Act of 1933. Securing such an opinion is the -gate
through which a party seeking to avoid registration must pass,. The
securities lawyer, as gatekeeper, can prevent regulatory evasion by
refusing to provide the necessary opinion when the requirements of
281the exemption are not met.
A well-functioning gatekeeper regime is an elegant -,enforce-
ment strategy. Wrongdoing is prevented, rather than punished af-
ter the fact, without the substantial administrative costs ofa fermal
enforcement proceeding. 29 However, the conditions necessary to
support a successful gatekeeper regime are formidable: First, .there
must be a gatekeeper and a gate--some service which the, 'wrcng-
doer must have to accomplish his goal and someone in a position to
decline to provide that service to those who would misuse it. Sec-
ond, the gatekeeper must be able to, detect with some precision
when his service will be misused, lest the problem,' of under and
overinclusion that plagued ex post enforcement be replicated in this
27. See generally Kraakman, supra note 16.
28. Kraakman's primary concern is with what he calls "public" gatekeepers-those
whose pivotal position and incentive to act result from a legislativelyiml.,sed.reguiatory
scheme. Id. at 61-62. My concern here is with "market" gatekeeperswhose-'osition and
incentive result from market forces. In the text's example of a securities lawyer in a
private placement transaction, whether the lawyer is a market or.a public giktekeeper
depends on whether the legal opinion is required by law or by the purchaser of the.
offered securities.
29. Kraakman identifies three kinds of costs associated with a gatekeeper enforce-
ment regime: administrative, private, and tertiary. IL at 75. Administrative costs are
simply the costs associated with making the enforcement regime work. Because in a
market regime, enforcement is a byproduct of market demand, there are no administra-
tive costs properly allocable to the enforcement element of the activity. Privatecosts are
the costs of actions taken by the gatekeeper to avoid making a mistake. Akaih, when a
market regime is involved, these are unimportant because they are demanded by the
market rather than imposed by regulation. Tertiary costs are the costs that the gate-
keeper's efforts impose on honest purchasers of the gatekeeping service. Id.
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enforcement strategy. Third, supply and demand conditions in the
market for the service that functions as a gate must support an en-
forcement regime: the gatekeeper must be willing to play that role
and consumers of that service must be willing to accept it.
Despite this litany of conditions, a gatekeeper regime holds out
the promise of effectively enforcing the prohibition against strategic
litigation. There are both an obvious gate and an obvious gate-
keeper. To commence litigation that has any chance of success, a
professionally prepared complaint must be filed with a court. To
prepare that complaint, a lawyer must be retained. If the remaining
two conditions are satisfied-if the lawyer can detect with reason-
able precision when the proposed litigation is strategic, and if the
supply and demand conditions in the market for legal services allow
the lawyer to play a gatekeeper role-gatekeeping can provide an
effective enforcement regime.
Understanding that lawyers can play a gatekeeper role to pre-
vent strategic litigation has an analytic advantage as well. One goal
of my effort is to highlight the economic value of some of lawyers'
traditional professional obligations. A central feature of the
Brandesian vision of a lawyer's professional role is the lawyer's obli-
gation to refuse to participate when a client proposes inappropriate
action. An oft-cited comment by Elihu Root captures the thought:
"About half of the practice of a decent lawyer is telling would-be
clients that they are damned fools and should stop."'3 0 Talcott Par-
sons put the same point more formally: The lawyer functions "as a
kind of buffer between the illegitimate desires of his client and the
social interest."'3
In the setting of enforcing the prohibition against strategic liti-
gation, then, gatekeeping provides a broader functional account of
an important element of the lawyer's traditional professional credo.
The remainder of this Part considers whether lawyers can reliably
detect strategic litigation and identifies the conditions in the market
for legal services necessary for lawyers to serve as effective gate-
keepers. Put more traditionally, we examine whether market condi-
tions allow lawyers to discharge the Brandesian vision of their
professional responsibility.
30. S. GILLERS & N. DORSEN, supra note 4, at 521.
31. T. PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 370, 384 (1954).
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A. Detecting Strategic Litigation
A lawyer cannot be an effective gatekeeper unless he can relia-
bly detect whether his client's motive in pursuing litigation is strate-
gic. In a gatekeeper regime, this condition serves the same function
as the definition of strategic litigation in an ex post enforcement re-
gime. An advantage of a gatekeeper regime is that the problem that
causes an ex post enforcement regime to founder is soluble.
The comparative facility with which a lawyer should be able to
detect a would-be plaintiff's strategic motive results from the inher-
ent nature of the task the lawyer is asked to undertake. To success-
fully frame and pursue a complaint, 2 a lawyer needs to understand
in great detail the factual underpinnings of his client's position. Put
generically, the lawyer must understand the client's starting posi-
tion, what the intended defendant did wrong, the injury suffered,
and the nature of the relief that might be sought.
Returning to an earlier hypothetical, suppose a high-tech em-
ployer wants to prevent former employees from establishing a com-
peting venture. During the factual investigation preceding the
drafting of the complaint, the lawyer must learn, for example, the
terms of the proposed defendants' former employment to deter-
mine whether a contractual claim exists, the nature of both the em-
ployer's and the new venture's business to determine whether the
new venture might have misappropriated the employer's trade
secrets or engaged in unfair methods of competition, and the com-
petitive position of both parties to determine whether damages
would be adequate and, if not, whether the balance of hardships
would support injunctive relief. Once the initial factual investiga-
tion is completed, the lawyer must evaluate the likely cost of the
litigation and its probability of success, if only to adequately inform
the client of the nature of the risk-reward characteristic of a possible
suit.
Against this factual background, the lawyer should have little
difficulty determining the client's true motivation in pursuing the
litigation. For my purposes, litigation is strategic when pursued not
to vindicate a substantive legal right, but as a device to secure a
business advantage by imposing costs on the other party."3 The cli-
ent's strategic motive will be apparent to a lawyer when it is a nonle-
32. Even if its only purpose is strategic, a complaint must be sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. To impose significant costs on the defendant, the plaintiff must be
able to reach the discovery stage.
33. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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gal business advantage, rather than the litigation's likelihood of
success, that justifies the expense of pursuing the litigation.
Of course, lawyer detection is not perfect. Unlike the case with
ex post enforcement, however, there is no reason to think that the
direction of the error will be predictably under or overinclusive.
Neither of the factors that resulted in underinclusive definitions in
an ex post enforcement regime-externalities in the case of an objec-
tive definition and the opportunity to plan in the case of a subjective
definition-are associated with lawyer detection in a gatekeeper re-
gime. To be sure, clients may have an incentive to behave strategi-
cally with respect to their lawyers as well. If clients could
successfully hide the strategic character of proposed litigation from
their lawyers with sufficient frequency, then lawyer detection in a
gatekeeper regime would be predictably underinclusive. Although
such camouflage is possible, I think it generally unlikely to succeed
in the face of a professionally skeptical lawyer.5 4
In sum, lawyers can satisfy the detection condition essential to
effective gatekeeper enforcement of the prohibition of strategic liti-
gation. However, that leaves the two remaining, more difficult con-
ditions: Will lawyers want to be gatekeepers; and will clients allow
them that role?
B. The Supply Side: Will Lawyers Want to Be Gatekeepers?
Whether lawyers will want to supply gatekeeping services is a
trickier question than may at first appear. A typical market analysis
would suggest that supply follows demand; if clients want gatekeep-
ing services, gatekeepers will appear. The difficulty here is that the
need for effective enforcement arises only because, once the veil of
ignorance is lifted, clients want to engage in strategic litigation. The
demand is for litigators, not gatekeepers. Thus, if lawyers are to be
gatekeepers, it must be because gatekeeping is, in some sense, a
consumption good for lawyers. Faced with a choice between in-
come-fees from pursuing strategic litigation on behalf of a client-
and virtue, a gatekeeper enforcement regime requires that lawyers
choose virtue.3 5
34. It is not yet a response at this stage to argue that lawyers' self-interest-to put it
crassly, the more litigation filed for clients, the higher lawyers' earnings-will lead them
to ignore their clients' strategic motivation. We consider in the next section whether
lawyers will choose to play a gatekeeper role. For now, the question is only whether they
are capable of detecting strategic motivation if they are so inclined.
35. One can imagine the development of a reputational model in which particular
lawyers openly specialize as gatekeepers because their retention allows a client to credi-
886 [VOL. 49:869
THE DEVOLU'rION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Why, then, might lawyers voluntarily trade income for virtue?
That the rewards of labor include more than monetary income is a
familiar proposition in labor economics. For example, it is com-
monly argued that wages vary across jobs to reflect, among other
things, job safety and other working conditions.36 It requires no
conceptual leap to assume that lawyers would accept lower income
if, at the margin, they value the sense that their labors contribute
something to the social good more highly than they value another
dollar of income.3
7
Oddly, skepticism about the existence of this kind of dollar-vir-
tue tradeoff comes not from economists, but from students of the
sociology of professionalism who have come to view professionalism
as a self-interested rationalization of standards of conduct that ben-
efit only the profession." Yet, history discloses a pattern of lawyer
behavior consistent with a utility function more complicated than
simply income maximization. My colleague Robert Gordon puts the
matter nicely:
Face it; the key ingredient [for professional indepen-
dence] is willingness to forgo individual or individual-
share-of-group income. I know that to many it will seem
incredible that lawyers in a position to make a lot of money
would sacrifice it to other goods. "If that's what it takes,"
they will say, "forget it." All I can do is point out that his-
torically lawyers have sacrificed income repeatedly.39
bly signal that his claim is real. This concept is part of an inquiry Robert Mnookin and I
are pursuing into what might be called the positive role of lawyers in conflict resolution.
The idea is that lawyers can play the ameliorating role of repeat players in a setting-
litigation-in which their clients are almost by definition one-time players.
36. To choose a familiar example, law professors choose to work for considerably
less money than their talents presumably would command in law practice.
37. Of course, the phrase "at the margin" says nothing about how much income the
lawyer must have before any trade off occurs, nor how the marginal rate of transforma-
tion changes across income levels and over time. See infra note 39.
38. R. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989), both exemplifies and surveys this literature.
39. Gordon, supra note 1, at 40; see R. Gordon & W. Simon, The Redemption of
Professionalism 12 (Paper presented at the American Bar Foundation Conference on
Professionalism, Ethics, and Economic Change in the Legal Profession, Nov. 1989)
("[W]e ought to consider that an important part of the explanation for the emergence of
professional rhetoric and institutions may lie in a sincere (and to some extent, norma-
tively plausible) aspiration for autonomy, solidarity, and responsibility in the work-
place.").
As anecdotal evidence of both the fact that lawyers' utility functions do trade off
between income and virtue, and that, as to this tradeoff, the shape of individual lawyers'
indifference curves differ, consider the enormous variance among firms with respect to
investment in pro bono work. Some firms, like San Francisco's Morrison & Foerster,
appear to pride themselves on forgoing a great deal of income for virtue, while other
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It is a different question, to be sure, why lawyers value the op-
portunity to act philanthropically, why their utility function includes
furthering the social good. For present purposes, it is enough to
repeat previously offered explanations that ring true when mea-
sured against our collective experience. The first is simply self-se-
lection. Many lawyers "go into law precisely because they are
looking for a working milieu different from what they perceive to be
that of business, organized (so they hope) around the 'professional'
values of craft excellence, intellectually interesting work, collegial
esteem, and public service rather than the commercial value of
profit seeking."40 The second, unfortunately from the perspective
of an academic in importance as well as in order, is socialization.
When law schools get it right, students are taught to internalize the
notion that being a good lawyer requires balancing our private in-
terest against the public good in a manner that does not always tilt
the scale in the lawyer's favor.4 '
Whatever the reasons why lawyers value serving the public in-
terest, the critical question that remains is why clients allow them to
do so. What gives lawyers the market power to say no to clients who
firms have quite different inclinations. There is also reason to think that the shape of
lawyers' indifference curves changes over time in a cyclical fashion, a fact consistent with
at least my perception that pro bono work by law firms was a more important concern 15
years ago. Morrison & Foerster also provides an example of this phenomenon, in recent
years experiencing significant internal objections to prior levels of pro bono commit-
ment. Cooper & Jensen, MoFo Gains with Pain and Glory, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 15, 1990, at 1,
col. 1. For an interesting effort to develop a model of cyclical shifts between public and
private activities, see A. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND
PUBLIC ACTION (1982).
40. Gordon, supra note 1, at 32.
41. In the Progressive-Functionalist model of the professional role, the most
important determinants of the professional's behavior are not self-interest and
coercively enforced rules but the goals of perfecting and applying her discipline
and, through that discipline, serving clients and society. This orientation is al-
truistic and idealistic, but it is not a matter of saintliness or self-sacrifice; it
merely reflects the fact that the professional has been led to define her own
goals in ways that mesh with those of the occupational group and the larger
society.
Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 568
(1985); see Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255 (1990).
Bill Simon's article is, in part, a harsh (unduly so I have always thought) critique of my
and Robert Mnookin's effort to explain the economic organization of law firms using the
tools of transaction cost and financial economics. Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Cap-
italists, supra note 1. A portion of the criticism was that this mode of analysis underval-
ued the importance of the Brandesian conception of professionalism. We had not
thought so. Indeed, part of the motivation for my effort here is to understand the im-
portance of professionalism to those outside the profession. In so doing, I suppose I am
signing on to Bob Gordon's and Bill Simon's efforts at what might be called the Stanford
Neo-Radical Rehabilitation of the Professionalism Project Project.
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want to pursue strategic litigation? Perfect socialization is one an-
swer; if all lawyers automatically declined to pursue strategic litiga-
tion the profession would be a self-enforcing cabal. A more
plausible explanation recognizes that entropy operates on cabals
too. What prevents clients from finding those lawyers who will pro-
vide the desired service? That question brings us, finally, to the
most interesting part of the story: the nature of the demand side of
the market for legal services.
C. The Demand Side: Will Clients Allow Lawyers to Be Gatekeepers?
The most distinctive characteristic of the demand side of the
market for legal services is pervasive information asymmetry con-
cerning product quality.42 In three critical respects, clients have dif-
ficulty evaluating either the legal services they seek to purchase or
those they have already purchased. First, prospective clients will
have difficulty identifying what service they actually need. In the
market for legal services, selecting the category of service to be
purchased requires technical skills. Second, even if the appropriate
category of service can be identified, the problem of quality uncer-
tainty remains. Like the prospective purchaser of many consumer
products, a prospective client will have difficulty determining the
quality of the lawyers competing for the opportunity to provide ser-
vice. Finally, a third characteristic of the information structure of
the market for legal services distinguishes it from traditional prod-
uct markets. In contrast to the consumer's experience in traditional
product markets, the quality of legal services may not be revealed
even after purchase. The result is that familiar strategies for dealing
with pre-purchase quality uncertainty developed in other markets
will be much less effective in the market for legal services.
My thesis is that development of the full service corporate law
firm and the long-term relationships such firms reportedly enjoyed
with their clients can be usefully understood as market responses to
the peculiar fact that legal services are subject to both pre-purchase
and post-purchase quality uncertainty. In turn, this solution to the
problem of information asymmetry in the market for legal services
has given lawyers the power to act as gatekeepers despite the client's
real preference, at the time a lawyer is hired, for a different kind of
service.
42. To my knowledge, Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. EcON. REV. 941 (1963), first stresses the centrality of information asymmetry in
analyzing the market for professional services.
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1. Identifying What Services Are Needed. -Prospective clients
enter the market for legal services when they find themselves in cir-
cumstances that they recognize call for legal services. Suppose a
potential client decides to start a business. The client knows she
probably needs a lawyer. However, unless she is herself sophisti-
cated concerning legal matters, she may not know what category of
legal service she needs, nor the appropriate quantity and quality.
Thus, one of the services a lawyer renders is diagnostic-advising
the client what needs doing and how it initially should be
accomplished.
Only after the diagnosis is made does the prospective client be-
gin the next stage in the purchasing process. Having identified what
she needs, the task is to select, on the basis of price and quality, a
supplier of services from among those competing for the
opportunity.
2. Pre- and Post-Purchase Quality Uncertainty.-An economist's
model of a competitive market assumes that consumers can tell the
quality of a product before they purchase it. Without that assump-
tion, competition between heterogeneous products is impossible. A
prospective purchaser would be unable to make comparisons be-
tween products, even if comparative prices were known. Producers
then would have no incentive to incur the expense of providing a
better product because consumers would never know which product
was better.43 Interestingly, the assumption that consumers can ac-
curately assess product quality before they purchase the product is
certainly more often wrong than right.44 Few consumers can tell
from personal examination the comparative quality of the television
or automobile they purchase. Competition works because market
participants have devised ways to overcome the consumers' pre-
purchase difficulty in evaluating product quality.
In general, the economics literature identifies three familiar
market responses to pre-purchase quality uncertainty: information
collection, warranties, and reputation. What is critical for our pur-
pose is that all share a central characteristic that makes them much
43. This is the standard rendition of the conditions that lead to a lemon's market. In
a market in which quality is unobservable, only the lowest quality of goods will be pro-
duced. See generally Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Oj. ECON. 488 (1970).
44. See Scitovsky, The Benefits of Asymmetric Markets, 4 J. EcoN. PERSP. 135, 138-42
(1990) (pervasiveness of seller-favored informationally asymmetric markets).
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less effective in responding to the problem of quality uncertainty in
the market for legal services.
One information barrier confronting a prospective purchaser is
the expense of gathering the data necessary to evaluate product
quality, especially if the purchaser is buying only one item and if
quality evaluation requires special expertise. A familiar market re-
sponse to the high cost of pre-purchase collection of information
concerning product quality is collectivizing the evaluation process
so that the cost of obtaining the information and expertise necessary
to evaluate product quality prior to purchase is shared among many
consumers.4" Publications such as Consumer Reports or testing pro-
grams such as Underwriter's Laboratories are examples of this
response.
A second type of market response to pre-purchase quality un-
certainty builds on the provider's incentive to resolve the prospec-
tive purchaser's uncertainty by disclosing the real quality of the
product. The problem is that a purchaser may not believe the dis-
closure because the provider also has an incentive to overstate his
product's quality. A familiar solution is to couple disclosure of qual-
ity with provision of a warranty that allows a prospective purchaser
to treat the information disclosed as credible.46
Finally, the provider can seek to overcome the prospective pur-
chaser's quality uncertainty by building a reputation for producing
quality products. This can be accomplished by making expendi-
tures, such as advertising the quality of the product, that would be-
come worthless if purchasers later discovered that the product was
of poorer quality than advertised.47
All of these responses to pre-purchase quality uncertainty share
a common characteristic. They require that the actual quality of the
product be revealed at least after purchase. Consumer Reports
purchases the product and then discovers its actual quality. A war-
ranty is useless if the purchaser cannot tell whether it has been
breached. And the logic of the reputation approach requires that
the purchaser ultimately learn the quality of the product so that the
45. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
597-606 (1984).
46. See, e.g., id. at 596-97; Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private
Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1981).
47. See, e.g., Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25J. L. & ECON. 27
(1982); Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
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provider is penalized, by the loss of his firm specific investment, if
product quality turns out to be lower than represented.
The peculiar characteristic of legal services is that a prospective
client will have difficulty determining the quality of the services even
after they are rendered. Because the quality of legal services is not di-
rectly observable to a lay client, the most obvious after-the-fact ap-
proach to quality evaluation is to treat the outcome of the matter
with respect to which the legal services were rendered as a measure
of the quality of the services. 48 For example, the client's perception
of the quality of the services provided by litigation counsel would
depend on how favorable was the verdict or settlement. However,
the outcome of any single litigation matter also depends upon a
number of other important factors, such as the quality of opposing
counsel or the perceptiveness of the judge, that have nothing to do
with the quality of the services provided. Only after the lawyer has
represented the client in a number of matters, when the other influ-
ences on the outcome would have had the opportunity to cancel out,
can the client discern the quality of the lawyer's services.
Nor is post-purchase quality easier to determine when the serv-
ices are provided by a business lawyer. Even if protective contrac-
tual provisions negotiated and drafted by the lawyer were, in the
abstract, of outstanding quality, they still would be of little value to
the client if they were unnecessary. Yet, because some of the even-
tualities against which contractual protection might be appropriate
are of low probability, their ultimate nonoccurrence is not a valid
indicator of whether the lawyer correctly predicted the probability
of their occurrence and invested an appropriate amount in
protection.49
3. Client Relationships and Law Firm Structure as a Response to Qual-
ity Uncertainty.-Demonstrating that standard product market re-
sponses to quality uncertainty do not work in the market for legal
services is the less interesting part of the problem. The more chal-
48. See Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capitalists, supra note 1, at 360.
49. Evaluating the quality of medical care presents the same kind of problem. Often
the diagnostic process is probabilistic. Observation of a set of symptoms signals the
presence of a particular disease only probabilistically. Similarly, the outcome of an indi-
cated treatment often can be expressed only probabilistically. In any single case, the fact
that the diagnosis proves wrong or the treatment ineffective is consistent either with
poor care (i.e., the wrong diagnosis was made or treatment prescribed) or with good care
(i.e., the correct diagnosis was made or treatment prescribed but the particular patient
ended up on the unlucky tail of the probability distribution). See Arrow, supra note 42, at
951-52.
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lenging task is to identify what techniques do respond to the serious
problems of quality uncertainty endemic to that market. From this
perspective, familiar patterns of lawyer-client relations and impor-
tant aspects of law firm structure can be usefully understood as re-
sponses to quality uncertainty concerning legal services.
a. The Diagnostic Function and Pre-Purchase Quality Uncertainty.-
A prospective client seeking a lawyer initially has need for two skills.
The first is diagnostic; the client needs a lawyer to tell her what serv-
ices she requires. The second relates not to diagnosis, but to pre-
scription. The client needs a specialized lawyer to provide the
prescribed service. Having learned enough about the client to iden-
tify the legal services needed, the diagnostician is well situated to
ease the client's problem of pre-purchase quality uncertainty by re-
ferring the client to a specialist. The complementarity of these serv-
ices-diagnosis and referral-suggests a pattern for how they are
rendered.
A proper diagnosis of the client's need for legal services re-
quires the client and lawyer to invest in a relationship specific asset.
The lawyer must learn enough about the client's general character-
istics and particular predicament to evaluate the client's need for
legal services. The client knowledge acquired by the lawyer is an
asset because it will be useful the next time the lawyer is asked to
assess the client's need for legal services. The asset is relationship
specific because the lawyer's knowledge of the client's needs-valua-
ble inside the relationship-has no value if the client selects a new
lawyer.5 °
The relationship specific character of the investment in the law-
yer's knowledge about the client creates an important incentive to
long-term lawyer-client relationships. While many lawyers may be
in an equivalent position to provide diagnostic services when the
prospective client first enters the market for legal services, the law-
yer chosen for the initial matter has a substantial advantage the next
time the client seeks a lawyer. Any lawyer seeking to compete for
the engagement must acquire the information about the client nec-
essary to the diagnostic service that the first lawyer already has. Re-
gardless of how the cost of the new lawyer's client-related education
is allocated between the client and the new lawyer, the original law-
50. For an explication of the centrality of asset specificity to understanding contrac-
tual and organizational relationships, see 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 52-56 (1985).
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yer can render the diagnostic service more efficiently.5'
The complementarity between diagnosis of the specialized serv-
ices needed and referral to a lawyer to provide these services sug-
gests a second structural pattern. The diagnosing lawyer's referral
serves to ameliorate the client's problem of pre-purchase quality un-
certainty. While a client may have difficulty evaluating the quality of
the lawyers who could provide the necessary services, another law-
yer does not suffer from the same handicap.
Now consider the situation from the perspective of the lawyer
providing the referral. He has a long-term relationship with the cli-
ent. As with other legal services, however, the client will have diffi-
culty evaluating the quality of the referral, even after it is made. The
client can be predicted to measure the quality of the referral by her
satisfaction with the performance of the lawyer recommended. As a
result, the referring lawyer has a substantial incentive to carefully
evaluate and monitor those lawyers to whom he sends his clients.52
The full service law firm-one that itself offers the specialized serv-
ices that diagnosis may direct-provides a structure that facilitates
efficient monitoring of specialized providers of legal services.53
Two advantages to the client-generating lawyer result from re-
ferring the client to lawyers within his firm, rather than to independ-
ent lawyers. First, the physical proximity of shared quarters
facilitates monitoring. But while physical proximity might be ac-
complished by contractual office sharing arrangements, a firm is
necessary for the client-generating lawyer to obtain the second ad-
vantage from what lawyers now call cross-marketing, that is, pay-
ment by the specialized lawyer who will actually provide the
51. Oliver Williamson refers to this shift from market conditions characterized by
many competing suppliers to market conditions characterized by one supplier having a
significant advantage over other potential suppliers as the "fundamental transforma-
tion." Id. at 61-63. The catalyst that triggers the transformation is the investment in
relationship specific assets by the customer and initial supplier. That the parties' invest-
ment in relationship specific assets causes their relationship to go from one of large
number competition to bilateral monopoly suggests nothing about how the efficiency
savings are allocated between the initial lawyer and the client. As long as the entire
efficiency gain is not taken by either party, both will be better off.
52. In effect, the lawyer's investment in the relationship specific asset serves as a
bond of the quality of the lawyer's referral that is forfeited if the quality is not delivered.
See Klein & Leffler, supra note 47.
53. Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26J. L. & ECON. 327, 334-35
(1983), point to another way in which law firms bond the quality of their work. Most
firms have resisted the urge to incorporate, leaving partners with unlimited liability for
each other's professional conduct. Voluntarily undertaking this liability for someone
else's work creates an incentive to assure that everyone does good work.
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service.'M Under typical state rules of professional conduct, fees
may be shared among members of a firm as provided by their part-
nership agreement. 55 A profit sharing formula that rewards "rain-
making" by crediting a lawyer for bringing in business regardless of
who within the firm actually provides the services provides for pre-
cisely such a referral fee. In contrast, fees may be shared among
independent lawyers only if the allocation is based on the actual
services each lawyer renders.5 6 Fees paid only for a referral typically
are prohibited.57
This fine distinction between permissible income sharing
among lawyers within firms and impermissible income sharing be-
tween independent lawyers is puzzling, the more so because it is
54. One could imagine an office sharing arrangement that also contemplated some
income sharing. For example, the terms of the office lease might allocate payments
based on a percentage of the lawyers' billings or even based on referrals among tenants.
However, an office sharing arrangement with some fee sharing is a perfectly workable
definition of a firm. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-100 (B)(1)
(1988) (" 'Law Firm' means: (a) two or more lawyers whose activities constitute the
practice of law, and who share its profits, expenses, and liabilities .... ").
55. See, e.g., id. Rule 2-200 (limitations on a lawyer dividing fees with another lawyer
apply only if the other lawyer "is not a partner of, associate of, or shareholder with" the
first lawyer).
56. The restriction on fee sharing has had its ups and downs. The formulation in
Canon 34 of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics barred division of fees unless
"based upon a division of service or responsibility." In 1970, the Code of Professional
Responsibility toughened the standard so that a fee could be divided only "in propor-
tion to the services rendered and responsibility assumed by each" lawyer. MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(2) (1980). The shift in formulation from
"or" to "and" has been interpreted to prohibit division based on obtaining the client or
bearing responsibility for what the other lawyer does. "Both lawyers must work on the
case and in some way the fee division has to be 'in proportion' to their work." S. GIL-
LERS & N. DORSEN, supra note 4, at 149. Rule 5.1 of the 1981 Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct both loosens and tightens the prohibition. In the absence of a client's
written agreement, a fee can be divided only "in proportion to the services performed
by each lawyer .. " MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (e) (1983). With
the client's agreement, however, the fee can be divided among all lawyers who assume
"joint responsibility for the representation;" presumably without restriction on the man-
ner of division. Id. Some states have eliminated any restriction other than client con-
sent. Rule 2-200 of the 1988 California Rules of Professional Conduct allows any
division of fees, including the payment of a referral fee in return for recommending the
lawyer who provides the service, if "the client has consented in writing thereto after a
full disclosure has been made in writing that a division of fees will be made and the
terms of such division." CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-200
(1988).
57. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 186 (1953). The prohibition does not appear to
be universal. 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES 246 (1973). In particular, California's cli-
ent consent approach would allow a referral or finder's fee so long as written disclosure
was made to the client and the client's written consent obtained. See supra note 56.
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imposed by lawyer-made rules."8 But an efficiency justification for
allowing only the payment of internal referral fees within firms can
be constructed. Both the diagnostician's selection of a lawyer to
perform the services determined to be necessary and his monitoring
of the lawyer providing the services are valuable to the client. The
danger that the referring lawyer will send the client to an inferior
lawyer just to earn a larger referral fee59 is minimized by the refer-
ring lawyer's expectation of continuing dealings with the client.
Reference to an inferior lawyer will destroy the asset which gener-
ates the referring lawyer's fee in the first place: the client relation-
ship. Thus, a bribe by an inferior lawyer in the form of a higher
referral fee will be effective only if it exceeds the present value of the
client relationship to the referring lawyer.
This check on the referring lawyer's incentive to behave oppor-
tunistically by sending a client to an inferior, but high referral fee
paying lawyer may be much weaker in the nonfirm setting. The pri-
mary situation at which the prohibition on external referral fees is
directed is referrals of injured individuals to personal injury contin-
gent fee lawyers. 60 Because such clients may not be sources of con-
tinued business to the referring lawyer, the referral fee predictably
may exceed the present value of the continuing client relationship.
In this situation, the lawyer's incentives lean toward directing the
client toward the highest referral fee payer. The firm/non-firm dis-
tinction may serve as a rough guide for those settings when oppor-
tunism is or is not a significant risk.6 1
58. The same distinction-prohibiting referral fees between independent providers
but allowing them between producers within the same organization-also is drawn in
the regulation of the medical profession. See Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of
Collective Economic Activity: Referrals Among Health Care Providers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1861,
1872 (1989).
59. The idea is that the worse the lawyer and the less likely that he will be able to
attract clients on his own, the more valuable will be the referral and the larger will be the
payment offered for the referral.
60. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 57, at 246-49; Spurr, Referral Practices Among Lawyers:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 13 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 87, 89 (1988).
61. The tradeoff presented by whether to prohibit referral fees is between wanting to
provide an incentive to the referring lawyer to pass the client on to a more specialized
lawyer on the one hand, and the concern that the referral will be made to the highest
paying, rather than most talented, specialized lawyer on the other. See Pauley, The Ethics
and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting, 10 BELLJ. EcON. 344, 347 (1979). One advan-
tage of limiting fee splitting to lawyers within the same firm is that the ongoing relation-
ship among the referring and specialist lawyers allows a more textured method of
allocating income more likely to ameliorate the conflicting incentive problems that com-
plicate Pauley's modeling. See Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capitalists, supra note 1,
at 349-52.
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This analysis suggests a pattern for lawyer-client relationships
and a structure for law firms. The lawyer who attracted the client
would act as diagnostician and as the embodiment of the client's
relationship with the firm. The client-generating lawyer would prac-
tice in a multi-specialty firm to whose lawyers the client's work
would be referred. The client-generating lawyer would be compen-
sated for attracting the client and, in turn, would have a substantial
incentive to monitor the performance of the specialists actually ren-
dering the services.62 The next step in the analysis is to understand
how this structure gives lawyers the market power to act as
gatekeepers.
b. The Lock-in Effects of Information and Post-Purchase Quality Un-
certainty.-Reinforcing the lock-in effect of the lawyer's acquisition of
relationship specific information concerning the client and its legal
needs is the similar effect that results from the client's acquisition of
relationship specific information concerning the quality of the law-
yer's work. Recall that because the quality of a lawyer's work is not
directly observable to a lay client, the client's recourse will be to
measure quality by a proxy-the quality of the outcome of the mat-
ter with respect to which the lawyer was hired. The problem is that
the outcome in any particular matter is a noisy signal of the quality
62. It is intriguing to speculate on the extent to which this analysis might generalize
to the structure through which other specialized services are rendered. As medical care
has become more specialized, the pattern of service has become one in which primary
care physicians-pediatricians, internists and family practitioners-serve the function (in
addition to rendering nonspecialized care themselves) of determining whether the pa-
tient requires specialized care and, if so, what kind. It is increasingly common for medi-
cal benefit plans, whether indemnity plans or health maintenance organizations, to
require a referral from a primary care physician before specialized care will be provided.
While this is generally explained as a means of cost control, it also serves, as in the
market for legal services, to ameliorate the patient's pre-purchase quality uncertainty.
The extent to which the latter explanation has force might be illuminated by studying
the way in which fee for service primary care physicians make referrals. The analysis in
the text predicts that primary care physicians both will monitor the work of the special-
ized physicians to whom they refer their patients and, one way or another, receive some
form of benefit from the receiving physician in consideration of the referral (although
direct remuneration would be prohibited by ethical standards and would amount to
fraud if the specialist was paid under the Medicare-Medicard program). See Frankford,
supra note 58, at 1867-69.
A second approach to the problem would be to compare the income of primary care
physicians in a multi-specialty group practice like a Health Maintenance Organization
with similar physicians in sole practice. The hypothesis is that, all other things being
equal, referring physicians in group practice earn more in direct income than similar
physicians in sole practice. The difference would reflect an effective referral fee paid by
the specialized physicians in the group, and not prohibited because the physicians were
within the same group .
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of the lawyer's services. The outcome is influenced by other factors
which are beyond the lawyer's control. Only after the lawyer has
represented the client in a sufficient number of matters so that, in
effect, the influence of such other factors on the outcome have re-
gressed out, will the client have an independent sense of the law-
yer's actual quality.
The value of this information about the quality of the client's
current lawyer provides another significant entry barrier to a com-
peting lawyer by raising the client's cost of switching lawyers.6" If a
client were to consider changing firms, it would have to incur the
costs of acquiring information about the quality of the competing
lawyer's services. Not only would the current lawyer be able to
render the service at a lower cost, because the client already had
invested in learning about its quality, but the lock-in effect would be
more significant the more risk averse is the client."
D. Summary
The analysis presented in this Part suggests that lawyers may
63. The concept of switching costs has important explanatory power in markets, like
those for professional services, in which pre-purchase information concerning product
quality is difficult to obtain. For example, Satterthwaite uses the concept to explain two
apparent empirical anomalies in the market for primary care physicians. Standard eco-
nomic theory tells us that, holding demand constant, an increase in supply results in a
decrease in price. The data for primary care physicians, however, suggests just the op-
posite. At any point in time primary care physicians in communities that have more
physicians per population unit charge more than physicians in communities that have
fewer physicians. Moreover, increasing the supply of primary care physicians in a com-
munity apparently has no downward effect on physician prices. Satterthwaite, Competi-
tion and Equilibrium as a Driving Force in the Health Services Sector, in MANAGING THE SERVICE
ECONOMY: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 239 (R. Inman ed. 1985).
In Satterthwaite's analysis, a physician has market power-patient demand is rela-
tively inelastic-to the extent that it is costly to her patients to find a new doctor. She
can increase price to the extent of search costs. The empirical anomalies are explained
by the impact of an increase in the supply of physicians on patient search costs. In a
community with a small number of primary care physicians, switching costs are low be-
cause physicians have well established reputations; patients of any one physician will
know people who are patients of the others from whom accurate information can be
obtained. Increasing the number of physicians decreases the likelihood that physicians
will develop widely shared reputations with the result that patient search costs increase.
The result is greater market power for physicians over existing patients. Id. at 247-50;
see Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Qj. ECON. 375 (1987) (genera-
lizing argument that switching costs create market power).
64. See Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capitalists, supra note 1, at 361-62. In the
context of legal services, risk is the expected variation in the quality of legal services
actually obtained. The more that is learned about a lawyer's services, the lower the
variance between expected and actual quality. Thus, a new lawyer, even if he presented
the same expected mean quality of services, would still present a higher risk because of
lack of information concerning the variance of the outcome.
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serve as effective gatekeepers in enforcing the prohibition against
strategic litigation. The necessary ingredients to an effective gate-
keeper enforcement regime seem to be present. Lawyers are in a
position that makes them reasonably effective at detecting strategic
litigation when a client seeks to pursue it.65 Further, it is plausible
that lawyers will want to act as gatekeepers even though declining to
pursue strategic litigation on behalf of a client is costly. Most im-
portant, pervasive information asymmetries concerning quality in
the market for legal services limit clients' ability to prevent lawyers
from acting as gatekeepers. The presence of quality uncertainty en-
courages a particular pattern of lawyer-client relationship and law
firm structure. Client relationships will be long-term because lawyer
acquisition of relationship specific information concerning the cli-
ent's special needs and characteristics and client acquisition of rela-
tionship specific information concerning the quality of the lawyer's
services make it costly for a client to switch lawyers.66 This cost bar-
rier to selecting a new lawyer provides the market power that shel-
ters the lawyer's gatekeeping function from the pressure of client
demand.
IV. THE DEVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
WHAT HAS CHANGED?
To this point I have shown that enforcement of the prohibition
of strategic litigation through a gatekeeper regime is feasible. Con-
65. There is an interesting relationship between the requirement that a lawyer be
able to detect strategic litigation when proposed by a client for a gatekeeper regime to
function, and the information incentives toward long-term client relationships-particu-
larly the incentive for the lawyer to invest in learning about the client-that make detec-
tion increasingly easy. The system seems to have an internal dynamic toward
effectiveness: the very process that makes detection more effective serves to further
raise the switching costs that provide the market power that allows the system to func-
tion over the client's objections.
66. Consistent with this account, a 1959 Conference Board survey of how 286 manu-
facturing firms handled their legal work reported that "three fourths of them retain
outside counsel on a continuing basis.... Companies most frequently report that 'pres-
ent outside counsel has been with us for many, many years,' or that 'we are satisfied with
the performance of our outside counsel and have never given any thought to hiring
another.' " 16 THE CONF. BOARD OF Bus. REC. 463, 464 (1959), cited in Galanter & Palay,
supra note 1, at 58.
67. Gordon, supra note 1, and Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1083 (1988), emphasize a lawyer's power to influence a client's action through the
way in which the lawyer frames the issues and characterizes the alternatives. What they
have in mind seems to me a species of gatekeeping, although the character of the gate
the lawyer keeps is less well defined than the prohibition of strategic litigation. If I am
right that their concept of discretion and mine of gatekeeping share a common core,
then they also share a common source-the market power discussed in this section.
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sistent with the Brandesian concept of a professional, the lawyer's
obligation to further his client's interests is limited by his obligation
to the public interest, in our case by declining to participate in pur-
suing strategic litigation.6 8 The task now is to explain what changes
in the environment have made it more difficult for lawyers to act as
gatekeepers. The lament that the legal profession is devolving into
a business reflects the belief that the professional obligation to the
public interest no longer constrains lawyers' responsiveness to cli-
ents. From my perspective, then, what distinguishes the profession
of law from the business of law is the lawyer's inclination and ability
to tell the client no, that is, the lawyer's inclination and ability to act
as a gatekeeper.
A. The Impact of a Reduction in Information Asymmetry
A demand side explanation for the devolution of the profession
focuses on those elements in the market for legal services that have
served to shelter the operation of a gatekeeper regime from client
demand. In the previous section, I argued that a gatekeeper regime
was made possible by the pervasive quality uncertainty confronting
a client in the market for legal services. In response to a potential
client's substantial difficulty in evaluating either her own need for
legal services or the quality of the legal services proffered or actually
rendered, a pattern of practice developed that led to long-term law-
yer-client relationships and full-service law firms. The result was
that switching lawyers was costly to a client. That cost gave lawyers
the market power to act as gatekeepers.
Now suppose there occurs a dramatic increase in the client's
sophistication concerning legal services. The client could then both
assess her own needs for services and evaluate the quality of those
competing for her business. The result would be largely to elimi-
nate the client's cost of switching that provides the market power
necessary to the operation of a gatekeeper enforcement regime.
Recall that the client's switching costs grew out of investment in
two relationship specific assets resulting from the client's pre- and
post-purchase quality uncertainty: the lawyer's information about
the client's particular needs and characteristics, and the client's in-
formation about the quality of the lawyer's services. If a client is
sophisticated about the market for legal services and can assess her
own needs, the diagnostic function is internalized. The need for the
lawyer to acquire relationship specific information concerning the
68. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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client is eliminated and with it are eliminated the efficiency gains
from a long-term lawyer-client relationship. Similarly, if the client is
sophisticated about the market for legal services, the client also can
select the lawyer who will render the needed service and will be ca-
pable herself of monitoring the lawyer's provision of services.
Moreover, the greater the client's sophistication, the more quickly
she will be able to evaluate the quality of legal services after they are
rendered. For a sophisticated client, it is easier to distinguish the
lawyer's influence on the outcome of a matter from the influence of
other factors. Thus, the referral function also will be internalized.
The outcome will be to reduce substantially the efficiency gains
from a full service firm.
The result is a coherent story of the demise of gatekeeper en-
forcement. An increase in the client's sophistication leads to a re-
duction in information asymmetry. The patterns of client
relationship and law firm structure that developed to ameliorate the
client's quality uncertainty are no longer necessary,69 and the
switching costs that provided lawyers the market power to act as
gatekeepers dissipate.7" Lawyers lose the ability to act as gatekeep-
ers and the profession laments its devolution.71
B. The New Source of Client Sophistication
One gap remains in the story. The presence of quality uncer-
tainty in the market for legal services predicted traditional patterns
of client relationships and firm structure that also provided lawyers
69. In a Harvard Law School study of thirteen large corporate legal departments, of
those corporations where at one time in excess of 30% of their outside counsel expendi-
tures had gone to a single firm, by 1983 no firm received more than 20% of total ex-
penditures. A. Chayes, Managing the Corporate Legal Function: The Law Department, Outside
Counsel, and Legal Costs, 13 Bus. Law Mono. (MB) § 7.01 (1988).
70. The same phenomenon impacts the internal organization of the law firm. From
the firm's perspective, the result is a reduction in firm specific capital which, because it
could not be removed by a departing partner, provided important elements of the glue
that held law firms together. See Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capitalists, supra note
1, at 356-68.
71. The same forces also result in lawyers reducing their desire to act as gatekeepers.
Recall that lawyers' supply of gatekeeping services is a function of both absolute income
level and the client's ability to penalize a lawyer-by switching-who supplies gatekeep-
ing services against the client's wishes. See supra note 40. With respect to absolute in-
come levels, Galanter and Palay report that between 1976 and 1986, the median income
of lawyers in large firms (more than 75 lawyers) increased 78% while inflation was up
93% and average hours billed was up 8%. Galanter & Palay, supra note 1, at 91 n.311
(citingJensen, Partners Work Harder to Stay Even, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 12). The net
outcome is a significant reduction in real income which, all other things equal, should
lead to a reduction in lawyers' consumption of the gatekeeping role.
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the market power to staff a gatekeeper enforcement regime. If one
posits an increase in client sophistication, the same analysis predicts
a dramatic change in the pattern of client relationships and firm
structure. Long-term relationships give way to retention of counsel
in connection with discrete specialized transactions; clients select
their own specialists; and the rule becomes to hire lawyers, not
firms.72 All that remains is to identify the source of change.
A consensus seems to exist about the identity of the culprit. As
Robert Mnookin and I stated four years ago, "[g]eneral counsel for
major corporations are creating a revolution and are the primary
agents of change."73 Increasingly, general counsel are former part-
ners in large corporate firms7 4 who are capable of internalizing both
the diagnostic and referral functions they previously performed on
behalf of clients as outside counsel. 75 The critical difference is that
72. See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR 368 (1982); R. NELSON, supra note 1, at 8; Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capital-
ists, supra note 1, at 385; Rosen, supra note 1, at 489.
73. Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capitalists, supra note 1, at 381; see R. NELSON,
supra note 1, at 57-58; Chayes & Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 277, 278 (1985); Rosen, supra note 1, at 483-84. One might appropriately object
that my emphasis on the growth of in-house counsel staff and increased sophistication of
in-house general counsel does not explain the decline in lawyer's market power, but
merely pushes the inquiry down a level: What caused corporate management to initiate
these changes in the character of the corporation's in-house legal staff?. Answering this
question requires a theory of the evolution of the corporation, rather than the corporate
law firm, an inquiry that reaches far beyond my ambitions here. However, I can offer a
mildly informed conjecture. I suspect that the key to the timing of the change in the
character of in-house legal staffing is the observability of the problem. The potential for
more effective internal representation may have existed for some time without senior
corporate management becoming aware of it. For the opportunity to emerge from the
background noise of a complex environment, legal fees had to reach a significant level.
Only at that point would questions of the organization of the corporation's internal legal
staff attract attention. M. Galanter &J. Rogers, supra note 26, offer some guidance as to
when this process may have begun. Their data on business disputes discloses a sharp
rise in corporate litigation commenced around 1970. Id. at 3. This suggests an explana-
tion of, and a starting point for, the phenomenon of the changing structure of in-house
corporate legal staffs.
One might still complain that the discussion still falls short of identifying the prime
mover: What caused the increase in corporate litigation? Galanter and Rogers have
begun consideration of this inquiry. Id. at 26. This moves, however, the inquiry from
looking into the conditions in the market for legal services to looking into conditions in
markets for the goods and services the client corporation produces, well past the bound-
aries of the task I have set for myself here.
74. Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capitalists, supra note 1, at 382; Machlowitz,
Lawyers Move In-House, 75 A.B.A. J. 66 (1989); see, e.g., Borden, Ben Heineman's In-House
Revolution, AM. LAW., Sept. 1989, at 100.
75. The internalization of the diagnostic and referral functions by clients has inter-
esting implications for a recent addition to the professional landscape-the national law
firm. The efficiency gains from this form of organizing practice are not self-evident.
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internalizing these functions eliminates the information asymmetry
between client and lawyer, so that no relationship specific assets are
created and no lock-in effect results. The consequence is a dramatic
reduction in the switching costs facing clients and an elimination of
lawyers' market power. The luxury of gatekeeping (and the good
life generally) is the casualty.76
V. THE DEVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: WHAT CAN WE
Do ABOUT IT?
To this point I have explained why a lawyer staffed gatekeeper
regime may once have effectively policed the prohibition on strate-
gic litigation, and surveyed the changes in the market for legal serv-
ices that can plausibly account for the deterioration of that regime.
The analogy to the Big 8 (now Big 6) national accounting firms seems unpersuasive.
Obvious efficiency gains result from having a single national accounting firm conduct
the audit of a client with operations spread across the country. Moreover, an audit is an
annual exercise for the accounting client. It is hard to imagine many legal matters so
geographically dispersed, let alone ones that occur on an annual basis.
A more thoughtful explanation offered for the advantage of a national law firm is
the potential for cross marketing. The idea is that a client who uses the firm in one city
and is pleased with the firm's performance will select the firm's branch office when it
encounters a legal problem in another city. Put in the terms I have been using, the
concept is a more explicit application of the referral function, another effort to organize
practice to alleviate the problem of pervasive information asymmetry that has occupied
much of our discussion in this and the previous Part. If that conception is right, how-
ever, the national law firm may be an idea whose time has come and gone. A sophisti-
cated general counsel who has internalized the diagnostic and referral functions should
not see much value in cross-marketing. And if this is right, then the existing national law
firms will be interesting to watch in the future. To the extent that individual branches
are treated as profit centers, hard times in particular regions create centrifugal forces. If
there are no efficiency gains from this organizational form to stand against those forces,
the national law firm may not turn out to be a long term fixture in the organization of
elite law firms.
76. Understanding how client sophistication reduces the ability of a firm to act as
gatekeeper suggests that a perceived irony in the ideology of professionalism may exist
only in the eyes of the observers. In their study of the Chicago Bar, Heinz and Laumann
report, from their perspective, the ironic fact that the more prestige lawyers have, the
less control-measured by the lawyers acting as gatekeepers-they have over their cli-
ents. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 72, at 380. The result is seen as ironic presum-
ably because their conception is that the more prestigious the lawyers, the more
"professional" should be their conduct and the more control they should have over
their clients. Once the source of the market power that allows lawyers to act as gate-
keepers is understood, the relationship between prestige and market power seems to be
precisely the opposite: The more prestigious the lawyers, the less influence they are
likely to have over their clients. Prestigious lawyers are those who service prestigious
corporate clients. Id. at 127. However, the more prestigious the corporate client, the
more likely that it has a sophisticated general counsel, in which event the less likely there
is to be any information asymmetry to give the lawyer the power to function as a
gatekeeper.
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Because this form of gatekeeping corresponds to an important com-
ponent of a lawyer's traditional professional role," the account also
provides an explanation for the devolution of the legal profession
whose current lament gave rise to my inquiry in the first place.,
Completing the positive analysis, however, inevitably raises the
normative: What can we do about it? In recent years, professional
organizations have devoted substantial time and resources to revi-
talizing the legal profession's sense of itself without, it is fair but
disappointing to say, much in the way of observable progress. What
remains in this Essay is to see whether recognition that a traditional
component of professionalism is best understood as a gatekeeper
enforcement regime provides insights into the potential for rehabili-
tating the professional ideal. To this end, I will examine three gen-
eral approaches to revitalizing a deteriorating gatekeeper regime.
Interestingly, two of the approaches reflect recent efforts to shore
up gatekeeper regimes in which the increasingly ineffective gate-
keeper was a professional.
The first approach to rehabilitation ignores the wrongdoer at
the expense of the gatekeeper: Simply increase the penalty on the
gatekeeper. Where the regime in need of help involves a private
gatekeeper, as with the prohibition of strategic litigation, increasing
the penalty by definition involves adding at least an element of a
public gatekeeper regime. In fact, precisely this approach was taken
with respect to strategic litigation by the 1983 amendments to rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The second approach takes exactly the opposite tack. It ignores
the gatekeeper at the expense of the wrongdoer: Simply increase
the penalty on the wrongdoer. Recall that the choice of an enforce-
ment regime is comparative. One reason to prefer a gatekeeper re-
gime is the problems often associated with the alternative of further
increasing penalties on the wrongdoer. 8 When the gatekeeper re-
gime begins to deteriorate, the alternative of increased direct penal-
ties may come to look better. This approach was taken recently by
the Securities and Exchange Commission in response to the prob-
lem of clients shopping for compliant independent public
accountants.
The final approach is quite different and finds its origin in my
earlier analysis of the conditions necessary to support a gatekeeper
enforcement regime with respect to strategic litigation. Once again,
77. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
78. See Kraakman, supra note 16, at 56.
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the concept is simple: Replace the gatekeeper. If conditions in the
market for legal services have so changed that large law firms can no
longer effectively act as gatekeepers, then we need to find someone
who can. It is a nice irony that analysis of the conditions necessary
for effective gatekeeping suggests as a replacement candidate pre-
cisely the party whose rise to prominence may have helped trigger
the deterioration of the traditional gatekeeper regime in the first
place: the new generation of inside general counsel. It is an equally
nice irony that of the three approaches, only this may hold out very
much hope for success.
A. Shifting From a Private to a Public Gatekeeping Regime: The 1983
Amendments to Rule 11
At least in formal terms, gatekeeper enforcement of the prohi-
bition of strategic litigation was never strictly a private regime. As
originally adopted in 1938, rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure did hold out the promise that penalties might be imposed on
a lawyer who wrongfully certified that "to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support [a plead-
ing]; and that it is not interposed for delay or is signed with intent to
defeat the purposes of this rule.... ." The threat of public sanctions,
however, turned out to be a mirage.
As interpreted by the courts, the imposition of sanctions under
the 1938 version of rule 11 required proof of subjective bad faith on
the part of the lawyer.79 We saw in Section II.B. that defining strate-
gic litigation by reference to state of mind results in a dramatically
underinclusive prohibition.8" Experience with the 1938 version of
rule 11 bears out this analysis. From the rule's original adoption
through 1976, only nineteen reported cases dealt with the imposi-
tion of sanctions under it. In only eleven cases were violations of
the rule found, and in only three were sanctions actually imposed. 8
As one of the drafters of the 1983 amendments to rule 11 put it:
"[Y]ou can count the cases under [original] rule 11 on your fingers,
and you do not need perfect hands to do it."82
79. See, e.g., T. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 36-37 (Fed. Jud. Cen.
1988); Schwartzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule ]1-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
182-83 (1985); Wade, supra note 22, at 505.
80. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
81. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problem with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-37 (1976).
82. A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE 14 (Fed. Jud. Cen. 1984); see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1334 (1971).
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That result changed, quite intentionally, with the 1983 amend-
ments to rule 11. The public commentary in the period leading up
to the amendments reflected the widespread belief that lawyers were
no longer acting on their own to block the filing of strategic litiga-
tion. The Advisory Committee Note that accompanied transmittal
of the 1983 amendments to the Chief Justice stated straightfor-
wardly that the Committee's goal was to shift from a private to a
public gatekeeping regime by imposing a realistic risk of sanctions
when lawyers did not live up to their professional responsibilities:
"The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to
impose sanctions by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney
and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions."8 3
And as if to underscore that it was the lawyers' professional responsi-
bilities that were being publicly enforced, the new operative lan-
guage of rule 11-that the lawyer certify his belief, formed after
reasonable inquiry, that the pleading
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation
-drew directly on the language of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) of
the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.84
Amended rule 11 seems to have had the effect intended by the
Advisory Committee. In contrast to the dearth of reported cases
over the 45 year life of the original version of rule 11,85 the approxi-
mately 4 year period between the amended rule's adoption in 1983
and the close of 1987 saw some 688 reported rule 11 cases. 86 Con-
sistent with the goal of more effectively policing the filing of strate-
83. Advisory Committee Notes, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) (citations omitted). Reporting
the results of his interviews with a sample of Federal district judges and lawyers, the
author of the most comprehensive study of the operation of amended rule 11 states:
The source of support for rule 11 is in its articulation of a professional duty to
examine and make a professional judgment about the legal and factual basis for
an assertion of fact or law .... To prevent sanctions, a lawyer must take a
position adverse to the client who insists on litigating a frivolous issue.
T. WILLGING, supra note 79, at 174-75.
84. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
85. It is estimated that over the entire 45 year period, fewer than 50 reported opin-
ions contained substantive discussion of rule 11. Nelkin, Sanctions Under Amended Federal
Rule 1 1-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74
GEO. L.J. 1313, 1315 n.18 (1986).
86. T. WILLGING, supra note 79, at 68. The principal substantive achievement
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gic litigation, it appears that well over half the post-amendment rule
11 cases involved claims for sanctions based on the filing of an un-
justified complaint.8 7
Thus, the 1983 amendments to rule 11 seem to have been ex-
plicitly designed to shore up a deteriorating private gatekeeper.
The goal was to shift from a private to a public gatekeeper regime
through the imposition of formal sanctions on the gatekeeper. This
approach has advantages. As David Wilkins has pointed out, an im-
portant result of the shift to a public gatekeeper regime with respect
to strategic litigation is that discussion of the standards of profes-
sional conduct shifts from a private to a public forum: "For the first
time,judges are actively debating the proper balance between client
and systemic interests."' 88 At a more practical level, an advantage
should result from having the strategic character of the litigation
determined by the presiding judge in that action, rather than by a
different judge in a malicious prosecution action that can be initi-
ated only after the initial litigation is resolved in favor of the defend-
ant. The judge in the initial litigation has the benefit of immersion
in context. Additionally, the not insubstantial incremental costs of a
separate action are avoided.89
Another important but less attractive result of the shift from a
private to a public gatekeeper regime is a parallel, although partial
shift from ex ante to (barely) ex post enforcement. This raises pre-
claimed for the amendment was shifting from a subjective to an objective measure of
compliance.
87. Id. at 78 (Table 12).
88. D. Wilkins, Reconstructing Professional Autonomy 146 (Aug. 1989 draft) (em-
phasis in original).
89. The California Supreme Court recently voiced precisely these reasons for main-
taining its restrictive interpretation of the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution:
After reviewing the competing policy considerations, we agree ... that the
most promising remedy for excessive litigation does not lie in an expansion of
malicious prosecution liability. . . .While the filing of frivolous litigation is
certainly improper and cannot in any way be condoned, in our view the better
means of addressing the problem of unjustified litigation is through the adop-
tion of measures facilitating the speedy resolution of the initial lawsuit and au-
thorizing the imposition of sanctions for frivolous or delaying conduct within
the first action itself, rather than through an expansion of the opportunities for
initiating one or more additional rounds of malicious prosecution litigation af-
ter the first action has been concluded.
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 873, 765 P.2d 498, 503, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 336, 341 (1989). Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979), argues persuasively that emphasizing sanc-
tions in the initial proceeding in preference to a subsequent tort remedy reflects the
broad historical pattern of response to strategic litigation, which was departed from in
this country only because of the American disinclination to tax costs.
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cisely the same definitional difficulties that I argued earlier led to an
underinclusive definition. By rejecting original rule lI's subjective
approach to defining strategic litigation, amended rule 11 avoids the
impetus to underinclusion that results from the inherent bias in the
fact finding process.90 But by adopting an objective approach-de-
fining strategic litigation by the degree of legal support for the
claim-the amended rule is impaled on the other horn of the under-
inclusiveness dilemma: the fear that too rigorous a requirement of
legal support will chill the development of the law also results in an
underinclusive definition.
While it is impossible to measure the extent to which concern
over chilling has influenced the development of standards under
amended rule 11,9 the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying
the amendments explicitly cautions against so applying the rule.92
Moreover, a significant portion of the current debate among com-
mentators and the courts over the rule's application is focused on
the concern that the standards applied not deter too much litiga-
tion.9" The continued concern over chilling litigation suggests that,
consistent with Section II.A.'s analysis, rule 11 standards will be in-
tentionally underinclusive.
Despite the inevitable underinclusion, federal courts have used
90. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
91. Part of the problem is the cacophony of formulations that the courts have used to
describe what behavior will violate rule 11. In making this point, Judge Schwarzer re-
cently listed six different standards:
(1) "[w]hen an attorney recklessly creates needless costs";
(2) "[w]here... [the plaintiff's attorney] has made no inquiry or has made an
inquiry that has revealed no information supporting a claim";
(3) where the attorney insisted "on litigating a question in the face of control-
ling precedent . . . and failure to discover such overwhelming precedent
suggests a lack of reasonable inquiry";
(4) where a paper is "frivolously, legally unreasonable, or without factual
foundation";
(5) "where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success
under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be
advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law";
(6) where there is "no support in any possible theory of law or any possible
interpretation of the facts."
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1988) (citations omitted).
In all events, none of the formulations appear to run a risk of being overinclusive.
92. "The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursu-
ing factual or legal theories." Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 83, at 199.
93. See, e.g., T. WILLGING, supra note 79, at 157-68; Snyder, The Chill of Rule 1H, LITI-
GATION, Winter 1985, at 16. Some evidence is reported that rule 11 sanctions have been
applied with more vigor against certain categories of cases that have as their common
thread advocacy on behalf of the disadvantaged. Nelkin, supra note 85, at 1327 & n.92;
Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1987).
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the 1983 amendments to impose some expost liability on lawyers and
thereby breathed some life into a failing gatekeeper regime. There
remains no reason, however, to believe that a public gatekeeper re-
gime of unavoidably underinclusive design can serve as a substitute
for the private regime that failed. Not only is the public regime of
intentionally limited reach, but the magnitude of the penalties im-
posed seem unlikely to create substantial deterrence. Of the sanc-
tions reflected in a recent sample of published opinions, almost half
were under $5,000 and over two-thirds were under $15,000. 9 4 To
be sure, a not insubstantial number of awards were of not insubstan-
tial amounts, some 17% exceeding $100,000. 9 5 Yet the deterrent
effect of even large awards is subject to question. To the extent that
the need for deterrence is greatest with respect to those lawyers rep-
resenting corporate clients who no longer will countenance a gate-
keeper, the award, even if of a size sufficient to deter the lawyer as
nominal target, may be entirely insufficient to deter the client, the
party on whom the incidence of the award likely falls. Moreover, in
a market in which the client seeks a champion not a chaperon, a
reputation for aggressiveness may well be worth the costs in sanc-
tions necessary to earn it. 9 6
The point, of course, is not that amended rule 11 can have no
beneficial impact on the filing of strategic litigation. Rather, it is
only that for all of the same reasons why a private gatekeeping re-
gime was desirable, a public gatekeeping regime remains a poor
substitute, albeit better than nothing.
B. Increasing the Penalty on the Wrongdoer: Disclosure of Accountant
Opinion Shopping
The independent certified public accountant is probably the
oldest commercial gatekeeper. To borrow money or sell stock, a
corporation must disclose its financial condition. The problem is
how to do so credibly-to signal to the lender or investor that its
financial statements are accurate despite the obvious incentive to
present too favorable a picture. A public accountant provides that
signal by serving as a gatekeeper. By certifying only those state-
94. T. WILLGING, supra note 79, at 80.
95. Id.
96. For example, responding to complaints of unethically vigorous advocacy on be-
half of its clients, the chairman of Sullivan & Cromwell was reported to have responded
that "[t]he complaints show Sullivan & Cromwell fights tough .... and 'clients like a law
firm that's aggressive.' " Gray, Legal Nightmare: Multiple Allegations of Impropriety Beset Sul-
livan & Cromwell, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
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ments that "present fairly the financial position of the corporation
as of December 31, 19zz, and the results of its operations and
changes in its financial position for the year then ended, in conform-
ity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a [con-
sistent] basis,"97 the accountant denies cooperation to those who
would present inaccurate information.9 8
Prior to the Securities Act of 19339 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934," ° public accountants functioned as private
gatekeepers. A corporation's decision to employ them was volun-
tary and the sanction visited upon a corrupted gatekeeper was only
reputational." The enactment of the core federal securities laws
transformed the gatekeeper regime from private to public. A corpo-
ration that sought to sell its securities or which had a sufficient
number of shareholders was required to provide certified financial
statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to the
public. Accountants who performed this certification were subject
to regulation by the Commission.' 0 '
As Reinier Kraakman has stressed, "multiple contracting"-
continued search by a determined wrongdoer for a compliant gate-
97. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA Prof. Stand. (CCH):
Auditing Sec. 509.07 (June 1989).
98. See, e.g., Benston, The Market for Public Accounting Services: Demand, Supply and Regu-
lation, 2 AccT. J. 2 (1979); Ng, Supply and Demand for Auditing Services and the Nature of
Regulations in Auditing, in "THE ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT" IN PERSPECTIVE 99 (S. Da-
vidson ed. 1979).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
100. Id. § 78.
101. The Commission has the authority to regulate the form and content of financial
statements filed with it pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. See id. §§ 77S(a), 78(m),
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Commission has exercised this authority
most comprehensively through the adoption of Regulation S-X, which sets forth a de-
tailed description of the form and content of financial statements required to be filed.
17 C.F.R. § 210 (1989). It also regulates the relation between the accountant and client
through the requirement of independence and regulates the accountant's professional
behavior through its power to deny an accountant the privilege of practicing before the
Commission. Id. 99 210.2-01, 201.2(e)(1). The public gatekeeper regime created by
this body of regulation has been recognized explicitly by the courts:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public
watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (emphasis in original), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984).
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keeper-is a serious threat to gatekeeper enforcement. 10 2 In the
context of public accounting, multiple contracting appears as opin-
ion shopping. When a corporation's existing accountant disagrees
with how management proposes to account for a transaction, a new
accountant will be sought with the understanding, explicit or not,
that agreement with management's approach is a condition of the
engagement. Not surprisingly, as the accounting profession became
more competitive and as takeovers reduced the number of potential
auditing clients, the pressure on accountants to be cooperative
increased. 10
3
Although the Commission has brought enforcement actions
against accountants who responded to a corporation's search for a
cooperative accountant, 0 4 the focus of its efforts to protect the
gatekeeper regime has been the imposition of effective penalties on
the would-be wrongdoer. Because the point of the corporation's
search is to find an accountant who will cooperate in hiding the real
impact of a transaction, requiring disclosure both that shopping has
taken place and of the accounting controversy at issue reduces the
incentive to shop in the first place. Thus, for some time the Com-
mission has required that a corporation publicly disclose the dis-
charge of its principal public accountant and any disagreement over
accounting principles that preceded the change.10 5
In recent years, the Commission perceived that opinion shop-
ping was becoming a greater threat to the integrity of the public
accountant's gatekeeper role. The result was a series of regulatory
initiatives directed at strengthening the barriers to shopping by in-
creasing the effective penalty against the corporation-that is, by in-
creasing substantially the required disclosure.1 6 As finally adopted
102. Kraakman, supra note 16, at 72-74.
103. M. STEVENS, THE ACCOUNTING WARS (1985), provides a popular account of in-
creased competition among accountants. The recent merger wave among large account-
ing firms-Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young, Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Touche
Ross, and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Main Hurdman-has generated an avalanche of
newspaper accounts of changes in the market for public accountants. See, e.g., Cowan,
Rivalries, Responsibilities and Some New Risks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1990, § 3, at 11, col. 1
("Forget about accountants being a mild-mannered bunch of milquetoasts. When it
comes to competing for clients, they are actually some of the most ruthless predators
known to humankind.").
104. See In re Stephen 0. Wade, Ralph H. Hewton, Jr., and Clark C. Burrit, Jr., Ex-
change Act Release No. 21,095, [Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 1982-
1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 73,432 (June 25, 1984).
105. See Form 8-K, 42 Fed. Reg. 4429, 4430 (1977).
106. See Securities Act Release No. 6594, Request for Comments on "Opinion Shop-
ping," [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,804 (July 1, 1985)
(Concept Release); Disclosure Amendments to Regulation S-K and Forms 8-K and N-
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in 1988, the amended regulations not only expand the range of cir-
cumstances in which disagreements between the corporation and its
public accountant must be disclosed, but require new disclosures
which focus explicitly on the shopping issue. If a corporation has
consulted with a newly engaged auditor within approximately two
years before the accountant's engagement concerning either the man-
ner of accounting for an actual or hypothetical transaction or a disa-
greement between the corporation and its former accountant, the
new accountant must disclose the issues discussed, its views on the
issues, and whether it had consulted with the former accountant
with respect to the issues. The corporation is then required to dis-
close a summary of the former accountant's views on the issues and
request that the former accountant review the summary and state
whether it agrees with it.'" 7 Under the new rules, the very act of
finding a compliant accountant makes the goal of hiding something
impossible to achieve. With respect to at least this matter, multiple
contracting is no longer a threat.
In some circumstances, then, increasing the penalty on the
wrongdoer can shore up a gatekeeper regime. However, it does not
hold out much promise with respect to enforcement of the prohibi-
tion against strategic litigation. To be sure, the penalty against the
wrongdoer can be increased in the strategic litigation setting. Rule
11 sanctions in substantial amounts' 0 8 can be imposed as easily
against clients as against lawyers. 0 9 It is unlikely, however, that in-
creased rule 11 sanctions against the client in the strategic litigation
setting can be as effective as increased sanctions against the client in
the opinion shopping setting. Most important, the imposition of
sanctions in the opinion shopping setting entirely eliminates any
gain from the activity. It would be quite difficult to calculate the
SAR Regarding Changes in Accountants and Opinion Shopping, Securities Act Release
No. 6719, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,139 (June 18, 1987)
(proposed rules amending disclosure requirements).
107. Securities Act Release No. 6766, Disclosure Amendments to Regulation S-K,
Form 8-K and Schedule 14A Regarding Changes in Accountants and Potential Opinion
Shopping Situations, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,431 (Apr. 7, 1988) (Final Rules); see
Martin, An Effort to Deter Opinion Shopping, 14 J. CORP. L. 419 (1989).
108. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
109. See Business Guides Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters. Inc., 892 F.2d
802, 808-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the position that under rule 11 a more lenient
subjective standard applies to clients rather than the objective standard that applies to
lawyers). This case has special interest because the law firm that represented the client
against whom the sanctions were jointly awarded-Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Underberg,
Manley, Myerson & Casey-is now in bankruptcy. Jenson, New Allegations in Finley Case,
Nat'l L.J., Mar. 19, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
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amount of rule 11 sanctions against a client necessary to entirely
eliminate the strategic gain from having filed the litigation. The
precise correspondence between gain sought and penalty imposed
that makes the increased penalty work in the opinion shopping set-
ting is absent in the setting of strategic litigation. Moreover, in-
creasing the penalty on the wrongdoer would merely replicate the
previously unsuccessful effort to deal with the problem of strategic
litigation through ex post enforcement against the client, albeit now
at a procedurally more effective time.'
Thus, increasing the penalty against the wrongdoer is not likely
to restore a deteriorating private gatekeeper regime. Together with
increasing the penalty on the lawyer, it may be better than nothing.
But what relegates these efforts to the category of second best are
the problems of underinclusion that inevitably accompany the asso-
ciated shift from private to public gatekeeping. Consequently, it is
worth considering whether the private gatekeeper regime can be
revitalized without "going public." This (perhaps naively nostalgic)
effort is the object of the next section.
C. Changing the Gatekeeper: A New Role for Inside Counsel
I have painted a quite pessimistic picture of the alternative ap-
proaches to shoring up the private gatekeeper regime for enforcing
the prohibition against strategic litigation. Increasing the penalty
on the gatekeeper does help some and increasing the penalty on the
wrongdoer probably would not hurt. But this increased emphasis
on the public aspects of gatekeeping cannot match the simple ele-
gance of a working private gatekeeper regime whose principle cost
is the exercise of the lawyers' conscience-as Robert Mnookin and I
have described it in a different context, "Jiminy Cricket in a three-
piece suit perched on each lawyer's shoulder.""' Thus, before con-
cluding that the game is over, it is worth addressing directly whether
the private aspect of the gatekeeper regime can be resurrected.
For this purpose it is necessary to return to the sources of the
market power that allowed lawyers to function as private gatekeep-
ers in the first place. In Section III.C., I argued that the central
characteristic of the market for legal services is the existence of both
pre-purchase and post-purchase uncertainty concerning the quality
of legal services. The response to the problem of pervasive quality
110. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (ex post enforcement); supra note 89
and accompanying text (timing of inquiry).
111. Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Capitalists, supra note 1, at 375.
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uncertainty was a market structure-multi-specialty law firms and
long-standing client relationships-that serves to provide quality as-
surance, but that, by making it costly to switch lawyers, also locks
clients into a relationship with their lawyer." 2 The cost of switching
provides the umbrella of market power that, I argued, sheltered the
private gatekeeping regime.
Recently, the umbrella appears to have closed. Increased client
sophistication reduced the information asymmetry between client
and lawyer that made it costly to change lawyers. A talented general
counsel can internalize the diagnostic and referral functions that
previously had contributed to creating switching costs. Reduced
costs of changing lawyers made private gatekeeping an increasingly
difficult proposition.' ' 3
The potential to resurrect a lawyer staffed private gatekeeping
regime appears from specifying more precisely just what happened
to the information asymmetry when the new general counsel ar-
rived. To be sure, the asymmetry between client and outside coun-
sel was reduced. I do not expect that outside counsel will have the
breadth of discretion in framing issues and characterizing the gov-
erning law and its goals that Robert Gordon and William Simon
ascribe to lawyers" 4 when the "real" client is a senior inside counsel
at, for example, the legal department being fashioned by Benjamin
Heineman, Jr. at General Electric. 15 I am far less certain, however,
that the information asymmetry between client and lawyer that pro-
vides the discretion to which Gordon and Simon appeal in fact has
been reduced. Suppose, instead, that the information asymmetry
merely has moved in-house. ' 16
The idea is that the informationally based market power
wielded by a professional with respect to her client results from, and
112. See supra notes 42-67 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
114. See Gordon, supra note 1; Simon, supra note 67.
115. See Borden, supra note 74, at 100 (Former managing partner of Washington of-
fice of Sidley & Austin becomes general counsel at General Electric and promptly hires
for senior in-house positions partners and managing partners from Hughes, Hubbard &
Reed; Dewey, Ballentine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood; Baker & Daniels; and Wilmer, Cutler
& Pickering).
116. Simply by way of example, suppose a general counsel seeks to buttress her view
that a particular action line management would like to take is unlawful by securing an
opinion from outside counsel. By the choice of the outside counsel to render the opin-
ion, and by the information conveyed to the counsel, the general counsel may have sub-
stantial discretion-because of the information asymmetry between lawyer and client-
to act as gatekeeper.
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therefore follows, the diagnostic and referral functions." 7 If these
functions are performed by outside counsel, then market power,
measured by the switching costs created, accrues to outside counsel.
If, however, the diagnostic and referral functions are performed by
the inside general counsel, then the associated market power ac-
crues to the general counsel. Here, then, is my best (and only) can-
didate for the next generation of private gatekeeper: the inside
lawyer. If we want a private gatekeeper, and the market power nec-
essary for private gatekeeping has moved in-house, then so too must
the gatekeeping function.
This is not the place to examine the very real barriers to actu-
ally internalizing the private gatekeeping function. Just as the exter-
nal market for legal services evolved techniques that ameliorated the
informational asymmetry between outside counsel and client, one
can expect internal organizational responses designed to ameliorate
the informational asymmetry between inside counsel and line man-
agement. Corporations will have their own agendas concerning the
distribution of political power within the organization and the po-
tential for an internal private gatekeeping regime will depend on the
particular resolutions that evolve. 81 8 Moreover, the risk is real that
inside counsel may not share outside counsel's preference for acting
as a gatekeeper. It is easy to imagine that the reference group of
inside counsel may be other members of corporate management
rather than other lawyers.
However, one interesting conclusion can be drawn. Private
gatekeeping represents an important component of the traditional
concept of professionalism. The reality of today's market for legal
services is that the most likely location of the market power for law-
yers to play this role is within the corporation. Thus, it may be that
the burden of carrying the mantle of professionalism has fallen to a
category of lawyers whom the legal profession has long considered
the least worthy. There is a nice irony to the possibility that it may
be left to the apprentice to pick up the master's burden. 1 9
117. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (diagnostic and referral functions).
118. Rosen, supra note 1, is a very useful beginning to the task of sorting out the
determinants of the internal market power of inside corporate counsel.
119. Lucian Bebchuk has suggested to me that the burden of gatekeeping, once put
down, cannot easily be picked up by anyone. Nelson argues that the content of profes-
sionalism-in his terms "professional ideology"-reflects the efforts of law firm leaders
to elevate to principle the reality of their practice. R. NELSON, supra note 1, at 277. The
process, likely grounded as firmly in cognitive dissonance as in sociological analysis,
means that at precisely the time we want to socialize in-house counsel that being a pro-




The study of professionalism by lawyers and sociologists has
been dominated by a myopic, albeit understandable, focus on the
supply side of the traditional market for legal services. 120 Similarly,
the response of the organized bar to the perceived transformation
of the profession into a business-what I have called here the devo-
lution of the legal profession-focuses on supply side responses:
exhortations, more or less specific, to rekindle the Brandesian spirit
in all of us. 121 In contrast, my argument counsels a very different
approach to professional renewal: The promise for resurrecting im-
portant elements of professionalism lies in understanding the de-
mand, not the supply, side of the market for legal services. The
traditional structure of professionalism, dominated by elite outside
counsel and sheltered by information asymmetry, has been rent by
changes in the market. The aspect of professionalism on which I
have focused here-lawyers functioning as private gatekeepers to
enforce a Rawlsian agreement among clients-remains a desirable
end which seemingly cannot be duplicated by public enforcement.
Changes in the market for legal services, however, strongly suggest
that the segment of the profession most likely empowered to play
this role is inside counsel, individuals hardly representative of the
profession's traditional elite. For those concerned about the future
of the professional project, the growing prominence of inside coun-
sel within the profession, reflecting their market power, is not a
threat but an opportunity, perhaps our only one. The message I
offer is that a necessary condition for professionalism is market
power. We had better start paying attention to those who have it.
of professionalism to exclude gatekeeping as a necessary attribute. In this circumstance,
Bebchuk then asks who is left to effect the desired socialization of in-house counsel.
I have no easy answer to this troubling point, in part because at the same time that I
suggest in-house counsel as the only plausible successor to the private gatekeeping role,
I share Bebchuk's skepticism concerning the likelihood of the project's success. It is the
case, however, that change in the content of professionalism is a gradual process-we
have not yet abandoned at least the rhetoric of the Brandesian professional. Thus, a
window of time may well exist in which the rhetoric of this element of professionalism
survives its demise in practice and can serve as a vehicle for socializing the next genera-
tion of gatekeepers. Maybe.
120. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 1, at 235 ("control over the services supplied is a basic
and justifiable part of the professionalism project").
121. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM ... IN
THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFES-
SIONALISM (1986).
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